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ABSTRACT 
Recent literature has investigated the impact of behavioral biases on asset pricing and 
one of these biases is shown to be investor mood. A number of studies have already 
documented a link between mood bias and stock returns. The objective of this thesis is 
to expand the existing evidence linking mood to asset prices and to investigate the stock 
market reaction to sudden changes in investor mood.  
 
Motivated by the abundance of psychological evidence showing the strong effect that 
sports results have on mood, the purpose of this thesis is to investigate whether there is 
a link between sport results, investor mood and stock prices. Therefore, the results of 
international ice hockey games, which have particularly attractive properties as a meas-
ure of mood, are used to examine the mood changes of investors. 
 
The data used in this thesis consist of the price of broadly-based stock market indices of 
Czech Republic, Finland, Russia and Sweden. The time-series data for regression are 
formed by the closing price of the index, from which returns are defined logarithmi-
cally. Indices from each country form a time-series between 1.1.1998 – 26.6.2007. Wins 
and losses in international ice hockey games of these countries are used to measure the 
sudden changes in investor mood. The games included in the study are the Olympic 
Games, World Championship games and World Cup games. 
 
To estimate the effect of wins and losses on stock returns, a regression model is used. 
No negative stock market reaction after ice hockey losses is found, except for Czech 
Republic after elimination games. No evidence of positive stock market reaction after 
ice hockey wins can be found either. It can be concluded that in most of the cases losses 
have more profound impact on stock returns than wins and also in half of the cases 
more profound impact was found when examining only elimination games. Results 
suggest that it may be possible that the effect associated with winning or loosing an in-
ternational ice hockey game is too small to influence the national stock market index.  
 
 
KEYWORDS: Behavioral Finance, Investor Sentiment, Stock Returns, Sport, Ice 
Hockey 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
There is no simple theory, which can explain the behavior of financial markets.  Theo-
ries are usually based on many assumptions, which are often unrealistic. However, theo-
ries about perfect and efficient markets have turned out to be especially useful to ex-
plain financial markets. (Leppiniemi 1993: 112–113.) 
 
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) reached the dominant position in the 1970’s and 
has been the central proposition of finance for over 30 years. The idea that speculative 
asset prices, such as stock prices, always incorporate the best information about funda-
mental values and that prices change only because of good and sensible information, are 
very consistent with theoretical trends of that time. Anomalies, however, i.e. deviations 
from efficient markets, were discovered and in 1980’s people started to support other 
competing theories such as behavioral finance. In the last twenty years, both the theo-
retical foundations and the empirical evidence of the EMH have been challenged. The 
main forces, by which markets are supposed to obtain efficiency, such as arbitrage, are 
likely to be more limited and much weaker than the efficient market theorists have sup-
posed. With the new evidence, behavioral finance appeared as an alternative view of 
financial markets. In this view financial markets are not supposed to be efficient. 
Rather, systematic and significant deviations from market efficiency are expected. 
(Shleifer 2000: 1–2; Shiller 2003: 83.) 
 
With the new evidence, some scholars started to argue that anomalies and exceptions 
from market efficiency could be explained by this behavioral psychology.  People are 
not 100 per cent rational 100 per cent of the time. This can be seen in two areas – in 
people’s attitudes towards risk and in the way people assess probabilities. (Brealey, 
Myers & Allen 2006: 343.) 
 
Evidence from the psychological literature shows that human behavior is often inconsis-
tent with the type of rationality that has traditionally been assumed in finance. Recent 
research has shown that investor irrationality and mood are, for example, due to 
weather, winter, daylight, Friday the thirteenth, and sport. Most importantly, it has been 
shown that when investor mood changes, so does his/her economic behavior. These 
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studies combine investor mood and investment decisions closely together. It may be 
impossible to create one profitable trading strategy based on investor mood and irra-
tionality, but rational behavior of the investors can be enhanced by identifying the situa-
tions when they are most likely to act irrationally. 
 
Based on this new evidence Kahneman characterizes financial markets as an individual 
investor: “the market has a psychology, more specifically it has a character. It has 
thoughts, beliefs, moods, and sometimes stormy emotions. The main characteristic of 
the market is extreme nervousness. It is full of hope one moment and full of anxiety the 
next moment. It often seems to be afraid of good economic news, which makes it worry 
about inflation. In short, the market closely resembles a stereotypical individual inves-
tor”. (Shefrin 2005: 203–204.) 
 
 
1.1. Background 
 
The majority of financial theory is based on the notion that individuals act rationally 
and consider all available information in their decision-making process. However, re-
searchers have found evidence that this is frequently not the case. Dozens of examples 
of irrational behavior and repeated errors in judgement and decision-making have been 
documented in academic studies. Repeated patterns of irrationality, inconsistency, and 
incompetence are revealed in the ways human beings make choices and decisions when 
they are faced with uncertainty. (Bernstein 2007.) 
 
Behavioral finance studies how these psychological phenomena impact on investor be-
havior. The long-term objective of behavioral finance is to behavioralize finance. 
Among others, Shefrin (2005: 1) has tried to behavioralize the traditional asset pricing 
theory, i.e. trace the implications of behavioral finance for equilibrium prices.  
 
Financial economists are debating about paradigm shift from a neoclassical-based para-
digm to a behaviorally based. The basis for the debate about the paradigm shift in fi-
nance involves the way people make decisions. People generally make observations, 
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process data, and arrive at judgements. In finance, these judgements and decisions per-
tain to the composition of individual portfolios, the range of securities offered in the 
market, the character of earnings forecasts, and the manner in which securities are 
priced through time. When academics are building a framework for the study of finan-
cial markets, they have to face a fundamental choice. They need to choose a set of as-
sumptions about the judgements, preferences, and decisions of participants in financial 
markets. The paradigmatic debate centers on whether these assumptions should be neo-
classically-based or behaviorally based. (Shefrin 2005: 1.) 
 
Traditionally, finance has adopted the neoclassical framework of microeconomics. In 
the neoclassical framework, financial decision-makers possess von Neumann-
Morgenstern preferences over uncertain wealth distributions, and use Bayesian tech-
niques to make appropriate statistical judgements from the data that is at their disposal. 
The main pillars of pricing in neoclassical finance are the efficient market hypothesis, 
factor models such as the capital asset pricing model, Black-Scholes option pricing the-
ory, and mean-variance efficient portfolios. In behavioral approach to the asset pricing 
those main pillars are replaced by heuristics, biases and Prospect theory. (Shefrin 2005: 
1, 12.) 
 
A number of studies have investigated behavioral biases stemming for example from 
over- or underreaction to new information, as well as how such biases can influence 
prices despite the offsetting actions of rational arbitrageurs. However, even in the ab-
sence of new information, the psychological literature suggests another source of inves-
tor irrationality: mood.  
 
It has been documented that many different matters are likely to affect investor mood. 
For example, casual observation of sport fans makes it clear that sport has an effect on 
mood as it regularly brings us laughter and tears, bliss and pain, in a sense of euphoria 
as well as gloom. No other type of regular event produces such substantial and corre-
lated mood swings in a large proportion of a country’s population. That is why sport 
results are used to represent the investor mood in this thesis. 
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Sport, in general, is documented to have a great influence on people’s lives. It attracts 
immense audiences, and has great economic influence and power, and it reaches into 
countries and communities. Sport is played or watched by the majority of the world’s 
population and it has moved from being an amateur pastime to a significant industry. 
(Hoye, Smith, Westerbeek, Stewart & Nicholson 2006: 3.) 
 
Environmental and individual factors influence on how and to what extent people be-
come involved and committed to sport. The more committed an individual is to some 
sport, the bigger is the disappointment if the supported team performs poorly and the 
bigger the joy if the team performs well. (Mullin, Hardy & Sutton 2000: 56–58.) 
 
 
1.2. Problem Statement and Approach 
 
The objective of this thesis is to examine the stock market reaction to the sudden 
changes in investor mood. Especially the purpose is to investigate whether there is a 
link between sport results, investor mood and stock prices. Behavioral finance has re-
cently been one of the most examined fields in finance, but the effect of sport results on 
stock prices has not been studied that diligently. Nevertheless, some studies have al-
ready been made about the impact of sport results on investor mood, which leads to 
changes in stock prices. A strong link between them has already been discovered, for 
example from soccer by Edmans, Carcía and Norli (2006).  
 
Contrary to Edmans et al. (2006) who used soccer results in their study; ice hockey re-
sults are forming the main set of data in this thesis. One of the main reasons why ice 
hockey results are used is that it enables also the examination of the Finnish stock mar-
ket. Ice hockey is closer to Finnish people’s minds than for example soccer. Thus, a 
stronger impact on investor mood and stock prices may be discovered. Czech Republic, 
Russia and Sweden are also chosen, because of the great importance of this sport in 
those countries. To examine ice hockey results’ impact, stock indices from these coun-
tries are being used as well as the results of the most important ice hockey games during 
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the last 7 years. The games studied include the Olympic games, World Championship 
games and World Cup games. 
 
In order to test the stock market reaction to the sudden changes in investor mood and 
the link between sport results and stock prices, two hypotheses are formed. The first 
hypothesis states that wins in ice hockey games lead to a positive stock market reaction 
and losses in ice hockey games lead to a negative stock market reaction. The second 
states that wins in elimination games lead to a more profound positive stock market re-
action and losses in elimination games lead to a more profound negative stock market 
reaction than if all the games in the sample were included. 
 
It is reasonable to assume that elimination games have a bigger impact on investor 
mood than non-elimination games or all the games in the sample altogether, because of 
the importance of the games. In elimination games the asymmetric reaction between 
losses and wins is also expected to be bigger, because while winning the game only ad-
vances a country to the next level, a loss immediately removes the country from the 
competition.  
 
The research is done as a time-series event study. The main advantage of the event ap-
proach compared to the use of a continuous variable is that it clearly identifies a sudden 
change in the mood of investors. The main disadvantage is that the number of observed 
signals tends to be low, reducing statistical power. Stock market indices of the countries 
form a time-series data, and they are used to measure the ice hockey results’ influence 
on stock prices. Indices from each country cover the time period from 1.1.1998 to 
26.6.2007. The returns are calculated from differences of logarithmic price quotations.  
 
To estimate the effect of wins and losses on stock returns, a regression model of the 
time-series variability of stock returns is employed. The dependent variable in the re-
gression analyses is the time series of stock indices, more closely, the logarithmic stock 
market returns from the each examined country. The independent variable consists of 
the results of the ice hockey games, that is, wins and losses. Wins and losses are form-
ing the dummy variables. The objective is to solve whether there is a link between sport 
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results, investor mood and stock prices by investigating Czech Republic, Finland, Rus-
sia and Sweden. 
 
1.3. Structure of the Thesis 
 
This paper consists of a theoretical and an empirical part. The objective of the theoreti-
cal part is to introduce the earlier research done in this field and also to explain the main 
aspects of the theories of efficient markets and behavioral finance. 
 
The first chapter gives the basic information about the topic and introduces the research 
problem, data and methodology in brief. In chapter two the previous research is being 
presented concerning investor sentiment, i.e. the errors that investors make in their 
judgements, as well as sport sentiment. Previous studies about sport include the expla-
nations on how important sport is to people and how it causes, for example, mood 
swings. Previous studies about the link between sport results and stock prices are also 
presented.  
 
The main aspects of the theory of market efficiency and anomalies are presented in the 
chapter three and the main aspects of the theory of behavioral finance in chapter four. 
At the end of the theoretical part a discussion about the controversy of the two main 
theories presented in this thesis is going to take place. 
  
The empirical part of the thesis is presented in chapters five and six. Chapter five de-
scribes the data, the hypothesis and the methodology of the thesis as well as the research 
process. Empirical results are documented in chapter six. Finally, chapter seven con-
cludes the results of the thesis. 
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2. PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
 
This chapter presents the earlier literature by concentrating on investor sentiment and 
secondly sport sentiment. Psychology has been combined to business science only from 
the beginning of 1980’s, and since then the behavioral finance has been one of the most 
examined fields in finance. A large number of studies have also been made about inves-
tor sentiment and the factors affecting investor mood and decision-making.  
 
Also the sport results’ connection to people’s mood has been studied relatively much. 
Some previous studies do link sport results, especially soccer games results on investor 
mood and changes in asset prices, but the connection of ice hockey results, investor 
mood and stock prices has not been examined extensively. 
 
 
2.1. Investor Sentiment 
 
According to Nofsinger (2005: 144–145, 157), the emotions are very important in deci-
sion-making. He stated that the social mood affects investor’s mood strongly meaning 
that the general atmosphere and other investor’s opinions have a great influence on the 
final decision. The main purpose of the study was to confirm that people make the mar-
ket fluctuate by their behavior, not the other way around. 
 
Vihanto (2006: 30) stated that the impact of feelings on stock markets and on the whole 
economy can be considered as an indisputable fact. There are no more differences in 
opinions about the fact that mood and feelings do have an effect on investor mood, but 
the question is, in which way these feelings and mood should be handled. Economists 
consider feelings as disturbance, and bias are often discussed. For example, in financial 
markets people are more likely to sell stocks that are winning than stocks, whose price 
has decreased compared to the time of the purchase. However, it should not matter, be-
cause it is a sunk cost and it should have no impact if investors act rationally. Explana-
tion to this kind of behavior could be the feelings of disappointment and regret. To 
avoid these feelings investors postpone the realization of a loss. 
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Also Barber and Odean (1999: 51−52) documented a similar findings on how investors 
behave. Firstly, they found that investors are more reluctant to sell stocks that have de-
clined in value, if compared to stocks that have appreciated. Actually, the effect of taxes 
is to push investors to do just the opposite. Secondly, they found that investors display 
overconfidence in the sense that they trade too much. This overconfident behavior is 
more pronounced among men.  
 
Some papers have connected stock prices to exogenous changes in human emotions. 
Saunders (1993: 1337) studied stock prices from exchanges in New York City and 
whether they have been systematically affected by local weather. The results of the 
study supported the view that security markets are systematically influenced by investor 
psychology and argue for including behavioral variables in models of asset-pricing.  
 
Also Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003: 1009–1010, 1013, 1028–1029) investigated 
whether weather has an effect on stock prices. They examined could sunshine lead to 
good mood, which would further lead to positive stock returns. The impact of weather 
on mood has been studied for decades and the studies have shown that sunshine affects 
on mood positively. In their research they proved that there is a significant positive cor-
relation between sunshine and stock returns. On the other hand, bad weather, such as 
rain and snow, did not have an impact on stock returns. They established that investors 
may benefit when knowing in what mood they are at a particular moment. Then they 
can avoid the mistakes caused by their mood that they might make when making in-
vestment decisions. 
 
Kamstra, Kramer and Levi (2003: 340) found that market returns are on average lower 
through the fall and winter than during spring and summer. They characterized it as the 
onset of seasonal affective disorder, i.e. a depressive disorder associated with declining 
hours of daylight. They found it to be especially strong in the Nordic countries. Patterns 
at different latitudes were also consistent with this interpretation. They concluded that 
because of the lack of sunshine people may get more easily depressed, which lowers the 
general good mood and eagerness to invest. If investors realized this beforehand, they 
could prevent the irrational decisions they might make. 
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Baker and Wurgler (2006: 2) found that stocks of low capitalization, relatively young, 
unprofitable, high volatility, non-dividend paying and growth companies are especially 
likely to be disproportionately sensitive to broad waves of investor sentiment. Also the 
stocks of firms in financial distress were, in particular, sensitive to investor sentiment.  
 
Avery and Chevalier (1999: 520) showed that investor sentiment apply also in sport. 
They found that sentimental bettors can affect the bath of prices in football betting mar-
kets. They hypothesized that football bettors, bet on past winners, follow the advice of 
experts, and bet on teams with name-recognition or prestige. They showed that bettors 
do have the mentioned betting proclivities and that these proclivities lead to predictable 
movements in betting line. They also showed that a betting strategy designed to exploit 
the sentiment-induced mispricing of betting line is borderline profitable in their sample.  
 
 
2.2. Sport Sentiment 
 
Wann, Dolan, Mcgeorge and Allison (1994: 347–348) documented that fans often ex-
perience a powerful positive reaction when their team performs well and a correspond-
ing negative reaction when the team performs poorly. Such reactions were documented 
to lead to increased or decreased self-esteem and to positive or negative feelings about 
life in general. 
 
Bizman and Yinon (2002: 381−382) examined self-esteem and emotions, following a 
win or loss of one's favorite team. They measured the state of self-esteem and emotional 
responses of basketball fans as they exited the sport arena after their team had won or 
lost an official game. The fans tended to associate more with the team after team suc-
cess than after team failure.  
 
Boyle and Walter (2003: 225−226) found that stock prices are systematically related to 
economically-neutral events. These results provided a significant challenge to conven-
tional finance theory as they implied that investor behavior and consequently market 
prices responded to factors and events that were not indicated by economic fundamen-
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tals. Boyle et al. attempted to generate further evidence using the relationship between 
sporting team success and fan self-esteem. They hypothesed that if sporting event out-
comes influence investor self-esteem, the outcomes might also have an effect on stock 
prices. They examined New Zealand national rugby team and the New Zealand stock 
market, because the situation where majority of investors are likely to support the same 
team is provided. However, they did not find any evidence of relationship between na-
tional sports team success and New Zealand stock market return behavior. 
 
Study made by Edmans et al. (2006) investigated the stock market reaction to sudden 
changes in investor mood due to sport results. Their study was motivated by psycho-
logical evidence that there is a strong link between soccer outcomes and mood. Their 
soccer data was formed from a cross-section of 39 countries. Their study concentrated 
on international soccer results, but they also used other sport results such as ice hockey 
and rugby. They did not find a significant market decline after ice hockey losses like 
there was a strong negative stock market reaction after losses of national soccer teams. 
The size of the loss effect was economically significant. There was no evidence of a 
corresponding reaction to wins in any of the sports they investigated. (Edmans et al. 
2006: 1, 23.) 
 
Also Ashton, Gerrard and Hudson (2003: 783) documented a strong association be-
tween the performance of the England football team and subsequent daily changes in 
the FTSE 100 index. FTSE 100 index represents the price of shares in the 100 largest 
companies traded on the London stock exchange.  
 
Boido’s and Fasano’s (2007) goal was to verify whether football results have a suffi-
ciently large impact on mood to justify a reaction in asset prices. They analyzed three 
Italian football teams: Rome, Lazio and Juventus, which have been quoted since the 
beginning of 2000. Their goal was to demonstrate whether there is a link between mood 
and stock returns on the basis of team performance and the special events concerning 
the Italian football teams. Results of their study showed that the average price/return 
ratio following wins is higher than average price/return ratio following losses.  
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3. MARKET EFFICIENCY 
 
Market efficiency is often defined with information efficiency. When the markets are 
informatically efficient all the relevant information is reflected without any delays, i.e. 
immediately and perfectly to the prices of the security. By examining information effi-
ciency it is aspired to solve whether the security prices could be predicted. By examin-
ing market efficiency it is aspired to solve whether the observed predictability is eco-
nomically exploitable. (Malkamäki 1990: 33−34.) 
 
When markets are efficient investors receive profits only related to the risk they are 
willing to take. If they wish to have higher returns, they need to accept also higher risk, 
that is, volatility of the profit. Making money in finance means making a superior return 
after an adjustment for risk. (Shleifer 2000: 3; Koistinen 2006.) 
 
The stock market efficiency can also be approached by the CAP-model (Capital Asset 
Pricing Model, CAPM), which explains the price formation. It shows that the equilib-
rium rates of return on all risky assets are a function of their covariance with the market 
portfolio. CAPM can be formulated the following way: 
  
(1) 
 
 
where E(rs) is the expected return of a stock, rf  is the risk-free return, s is the beta of the 
stock and E(rm) is the expected return of the market. (Sharpe, Alexander & Bailey 1999: 
235.) 
 
The CAP-model was developed by Treynor (1961), Sharpe (1963) and Lintner (1965). 
The assumptions of efficient markets are presumed in the model. It states that the ex-
pected risk premium of an asset is directly proportional to its beta, and that the expected 
return is the sum of a risk-free asset return and the risk premium. The risk premium of 
an asset is calculated as the product of expected market return over the risk-free return 
and the correlation coefficient () between the asset return and the return of the market. 
Given the directly proportional relationship between the asset beta and the expected 
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return, it can be expressed in a linear fashion by using Security Market Line (SML), 
which is the linear relationship between the expected return of security and its system-
atic risk. Thus, the CAPM states that the expected return of every asset must lay on the 
SML. If the CAPM is valid, any evidence of persistent deviations from the security 
market line can be interpreted as evidence of inefficiency of the markets. Thus, empiri-
cal CAPM tests can be regarded as the efficiency tests of the markets. (Copeland, Wes-
ton & Shastri 2005: 147, 371–372.) 
 
A second important equilibrium pricing model, the arbitrage pricing theory (APT), was 
developed by Ross (1976). The return on any risky asset is seen to be a linear combina-
tion of various common factors that affect asset returns. It allows numerous factors to 
explain the equilibrium return on a risky asset and is therefore more general than the 
CAPM. Market efficiency relies on the ability of arbitrageurs to recognize that prices 
are out of line and to make a profit by driving them back to an equilibrium value consis-
tent with available information. (Copeland et al. 2005: 147, 372.) 
 
The APT imposes following four assumptions:  
 
- asset markets are perfectly competitive and frictionless; 
- investors are expected utility maximizers; 
- the number of stocks is much greater than the number of factors in k-factor 
model; 
- investors believe homogenously that the random returns of securities are gov-
erned by k-factor model of the form: 
 
(2)  
 
where Rit is the return of the stock i at time t, Ei is the stock’s expected return, kt is the 
realization of the common factor k, ik is the sensitivity of the return of stock i to the 
common factor k, i.e. the factor loading and it is the idiosyncratic return on the stock i. 
The idiosyncratic return is assumed to be sufficiently independent across stocks and to 
 19 
have zero mean and finite variance so that the corresponding risk can be eliminated by 
using large and well diversified portfolios. (Roll & Ross 1980: 1076; Huberman 1982: 
189−190; Lehman & Modest 1988: 215.) 
 
When compared with the CAPM, which explains the differences in stock returns with 
differences in their betas, the APT makes an assumption that stock returns are explained 
by an unknown number of unknown factors (Sharpe et al. 1999: 283). In fact, CAPM 
and APT are so close to each other econometrically that the former can be seen as a 
special case of the latter when the return of the market portfolio is assumed to be the 
only relevant factor affecting the return of each stock (Copeland & Weston 1988: 219).  
 
 
3.1. Perfect Markets 
 
The constraints that make stock markets efficient are derived in the theory of finance. 
However, it is useful first to describe the perfect markets (Copeland et al. 2005: 
353−354). The following constraints are considered to be necessary for perfect capital 
markets: 
 
- markets are frictionless; i.e. there are no transaction costs or taxes, all assets are 
divisible and marketable, and there are no constraining regulations; 
- there is perfect competition in securities markets; i.e. all participants are price 
takers; 
- markets are informationally efficient; i.e. information is costless, and it is re-
ceived simultaneously by all individuals; 
- all individuals are rational and expected utility maximizers. 
 
Given these conditions, markets will be both allocationally and operationally efficient. 
Allocationally efficient markets mean that prices are determined in a way that equals the 
marginal rates of return. Operational efficiency means that the transaction costs are as-
sumed to be zero and markets are perfectly liquid. (Copeland et al. 2005: 353−354.) 
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In reality perfect markets do not exist. For example, transaction costs are always related 
to a trade. Efficiency can be obtained although the constraints mentioned above do not 
come true. Market efficiency is much less restrictive than the notion of perfect markets. 
In efficient markets, prices fully and instantaneously reflect all available relevant infor-
mation. This means that when assets are traded, prices are accurate signals for capital 
allocation. (Fama 1970: 387–388; Lev 1974: 214–218; Copeland et al. 2005: 353−354.) 
 
 
3.2. Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) 
 
Because there are no perfect markets, the concept is often replaced with the market effi-
ciency. Many investment strategies and models explaining stock prices are created 
based on the theory about market efficiency. (Leppiniemi 1993: 115−116.) 
 
Fama (1970: 384) categorized market efficiency into the three following classes on the 
basis of what type of information is relevant according to phrase ‘all prices fully reflect 
all relevant information’: 
 
1) Weak-form efficiency. Security prices fully reflect all historical price or return in-
formation. Excess returns can not be earned by observing past prices or returns. 
The future stock returns are random and entirely unpredictable based on past re-
turns. 
 
2) Semi-strong efficiency. Security prices will instantaneously reflect all public in-
formation. Excess returns cannot be earned by analyzing any publicly available in-
formation, i.e. as soon as information becomes public, it is immediately incorpo-
rated into the prices, and hence an investor cannot gain by using this information 
to predict returns. 
 
3) Strong-form efficiency. Security prices reflect all information, both publicly 
available and insider information. No excess returns can be earned by analyzing 
any information, public or not.  
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The three degrees of efficiency are dependent on each other. In other words market has 
to fulfill the conditions of weak-form efficiency before it can fulfill the conditions of 
semi-strong efficiency, and in order to fulfill the conditions of the strong-form effi-
ciency the semi-strong conditions have to be achieved. If this relation does not exist, the 
prices do not reflect all fundamental information. (Fama 1970: 384.) 
 
3.2.1. The Theoretical Foundation of the EMH 
 
The EMH rests on three theoretical arguments. Firstly, investors are assumed to be ra-
tional, and to value securities rationally. Secondly, to the extent that some investors are 
not rational, their trades are random and therefore cancel each other out without affect-
ing prices. Thirdly, to the extent that investors are irrational in similar ways, they are 
met in the market by rational arbitrageurs, who eliminate their influence on prices. 
(Shleifer 2000: 2.) 
 
Sharpe et al. (1999: 907) defined arbitrage as the simultaneous purchase and sale of the 
same, or essentially similar, security in two different markets at advantageously differ-
ent prices. Thus, when people are rational, markets are rational, and when some people 
are irrational, they usually trade with each other. Hence, that has only a limited influ-
ence on prices even without countervailing trading by the rational investors. Such coun-
tervailing traders do exist and it brings prices closer to fundamental values. Competition 
between arbitrageurs for superior returns ensures that the adjustment of prices to fun-
damental values is immediate. (Shleifer 2000: 3.) 
 
When investors are considered to be rational, they value each security for its fundamen-
tal value, which is the net present value of its future cash flows, discounted using their 
risk characteristics. When investors receive some new information about fundamental 
values of the securities, they quickly respond to that information by bidding up prices, if 
the information is good, and bidding down prices when the information is bad. As a 
result, security prices incorporate all the available information almost immediately and 
prices adjust to new levels, corresponding the new net present values of cash flows. If 
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the irrational investors manage to transact with prices that are not fundamental values, 
they usually only hurt themselves. (Shleifer 2000: 2–3.) 
 
 
3.3. Anomalies  
 
Anomalies are empirical results that seem to be inconsistent with maintained theories of 
asset pricing behavior. They indicate either market inefficiency (profit opportunities) or 
inadequacies in the underlying asset pricing model. After they are documented and ana-
lyzed in the academic literature, they often seem to disappear, reverse or attenuate. 
Theoretically an anomaly should disappear as traders attempt to take advantage of it in 
advance. (Shleifer 2000: 18–19; Schwert 2002: 3.) 
 
Despite the strong evidence that the stock markets are highly efficient, anomalies do 
exist. While the existence of these anomalies is accepted, the question of whether inves-
tors can exploit them so that they could earn abnormal returns in the future is subject to 
debate. 
 
3.3.1. Calendar Anomalies 
 
The best knows calendar anomalies are January effect, turn-of-the-month effect and 
day-of-the-week effect. In January returns are higher than normally and it has also been 
historically the best month to invest in stocks. The January effect is shown to occur 
most dramatically for the smaller firms, because the small-firm group includes stocks 
with the greatest variability of prices during the year. Although, there is no evidence 
that using standard measure of risk small stocks are riskier in January. (Shleifer 2000: 
18–19; Bodie, Kane & Marcus 2005: 390.) 
 
According to Haugen & Jorion (1996: 27–31) the January effect is, perhaps the best-
known example of anomalous behavior in security markets throughout the world. Since 
the coming of the January is information known to the market, this evidence points out 
that excess returns can be obtained in contrast to semi-strong form efficiency.  
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There are also many empirical findings that mean stock rates of return vary according to 
the day of the week. The average return on Mondays is found to be much lower than the 
average return on any other day of the week. In other words, at the end of the week the 
returns are higher than normally. Returns are also showed to be higher at the beginning 
of the month. (Sharpe et al. 1999: 497.) 
 
3.3.2. Fundamental Anomalies 
 
The best-known fundamental anomalies are the size effect as well as P/BV 
(price/balance value) and E/P (earnings/price) anomalies. These mean that bigger ab-
normal returns occur for those companies that have bigger P/BV and E/P numbers and 
that smaller companies have greater returns than bigger ones. It is shown that in the 
long run small stocks have earned higher returns than large stocks, even if proportioned 
with risk. (Martikainen & Martikainen 2002: 133.) 
 
It has also been discovered that companies with the highest market-to-book ratios are 
relatively the most expensive growth firms, whereas those with the lowest ratios are 
relatively the cheapest value firms (Shleifer 2000: 19). Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1994: 1575) found that portfolios of companies with high market-to-book ratios have 
earned sharply lower returns than those with low ratios.  
 
The size and the market-to-book ratio present a serious challenge to the EMH. Fama 
and French (1993: 53−55; 1996: 82) interpreted both a company’s market capitalization 
and its market-to-book ratio as measures of fundamental riskiness of a stock in so-called 
three-factor-model.  According to this model, stocks of smaller firms or of firms with 
low market-to-book ratios must earn higher average returns because they are fundamen-
tally riskier as measured by their higher exposure to size and market-to-book factors. 
Conversely, large stocks earn lower returns because they are safer. Growth stocks with 
high market-to-book ratios also earn lower average returns because they represent 
hedges against market-to-book risk. 
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Important academic discussion arose in the 1980’s about the consistency of the efficient 
market model for the aggregate stock market with econometric evidence about the time-
series properties of prices, dividends and earnings. Especially, whether these stocks 
show excess volatility relative to what would be predicted by the efficient market model 
was discussed. The anomalies that had been discovered could be considered as a failure 
of efficient market theory to explain the fundamental truth of financial markets. How-
ever, if most of the volatility in the stock market was unexplained, it would call into 
question the basic underpinnings of the entire efficient market theory. (Shiller 2003: 
84.) 
 
The anomaly of excess volatility seems to be much more troubling for the theory of 
efficient markets than other financial anomalies, such as the January effect or the day-
of-the-week effect. It has been discovered that in the United States stock returns are 
somewhat predictable by using stock price volatilities (Malkamäki 1990: 36). The evi-
dence regarding excess volatility seems to imply that changes in prices occur for no 
fundamental reason at all, but that they occur for example because of mass psychology. 
(Shiller 2003: 84). 
 
3.3.3. Explanations for Anomalies 
 
When the stock markets are efficient the phenomena mentioned earlier and systematic 
profits should disappear, because all essential anomalies are known. If these phenomena 
occur anyhow, it could be a sign of inefficiency in the stock markets. According to Put-
tonen (2001: 102) possible inefficiencies disappear very rapidly and are not likely to 
come back as identical. Exploiting inefficiencies at the markets is very difficult, because 
they are changing when time passes by. In addition there are many companies and indi-
viduals that have big resources trying to find the inefficiencies in the market. (Marti-
kainen et al. 2002: 133−134.) 
 
Many believe that these observed anomalies are caused by cash flows that are coming to 
the market unsteadily. Other explanations can be reporting and taxation practices at the 
turn of the year (Chang and Pinegar 1989: 59–60). For example, salaries are paid at the 
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end of the month or in the middle of the month, not smoothly every day. Investors have 
more time to analyze stocks during the weekends than during weekdays. Some believe 
that anomalies occur because of psychological factors. This presents an interesting ques-
tion: Could the effect be caused by the mood of market participants? People are gener-
ally in better mood on Fridays and before holidays, but are generally grumpy on Mon-
days. Thus, it can be seen that at the end of the week returns are higher and lower on 
Mondays. (Martikainen et al. 2002: 133−134.) 
 
Some researchers believe that stock markets function efficiently despite of the anoma-
lies. They think that these phenomena are more or less measurement errors than genuine 
proof of market inefficiency. To measure stock returns there are many statistic questions 
that may distort the measurement results, such as normal distribution of returns, loga-
rithmic versus percentual returns, and how mean returns are calculated. Because the 
stocks of small companies are traded scantier than bigger companies’ stocks, there is a 
possibility that the beta coefficient, which measures risk, will distort and become too 
small when measuring small companies. This will make risk-adjusted returns look 
higher when considering small firms. Risk-adjusted return means return earned on an 
asset, which is normalized by the amount of risk associated with that asset. For exam-
ple, when using Capital Asset Pricing Model, the risk-adjusted return can be obtained 
when the stock return given by the CAPM is being reduced from the actual return. Prob-
lems related to risk measurement are often interpreted as notable reasons, which lead to 
anomalies. (Martikainen et al. 2002: 133−134.) 
 
 
3.4. Data Mining 
 
It is questioned whether anomalies are really anomalies or an artifact of data mining, 
which is the process of automatically searching large volumes of data for patterns using 
tools such as classification. In this regard, some anomalies have not shown much per-
manency after being reported in the academic literature. (Bodie et al. 2005: 396.) 
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The rapid evolution of computer technology in the last few decades has given investors 
the capability to access and analyze great amounts of financial data. Additionally, the 
World Wide Web and email make it possible for people around the world to access this 
information quickly, as well as provide a means for individuals to share their opinions 
and interact. As a result, some of the most intriguing topics of debate in recent years 
have been about the practice and consequences of data mining. (Bodie et al. 2005: 396.) 
 
Data mining involves searching through databases for correlations and patterns that dif-
fer from results that would be anticipated to occur by chance or in random conditions. 
For example, in an attempt to improve life expectancy researchers might use data min-
ing to analyze causes and correlations with death rates. However, probably the most 
interesting group of data miners is stock market researchers that are trying to predict 
future stock price movement. Most of the stock market anomalies have been discovered 
via data mining of past prices and related variables. (Bodie et al. 2005: 396.) 
 
 
3.5. Predictability of Stock Returns 
 
In 1953 Kendall realized that stock prices do not follow any regular price cycles, but 
they are random (see Brealey et al. 2006: 333). In other words, stock prices seemed to 
follow a random walk. Thus, price changes are independent of one another. More gen-
erally, any information that could be used to predict stock performance should already 
be reflected in stock prices. New information must be unpredictable, because if it could 
be predicted, then the prediction would be a part of today’s information. Thus, stock 
prices that change in response to new information must also move unpredictably. This is 
the essence of a random walk, which means that price changes should be random and 
unpredictable. Randomly evolving stock prices are the necessary consequences of intel-
ligent investors trying to discover relevant information, on which to buy or sell stocks 
before the rest of the market also obtains that same information. (Bodie et al. 2005: 
370–371.) 
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Although the stock market was long thought to be a random walk, and thus unpredict-
able, numerous researchers have found that over long horizons the returns on the stock 
market are at least somewhat predictable (Thaler 2005: 2). Malkiel (2003: 60) stated 
that at the beginning of 21st century people started to believe that at the certain probabil-
ity prices could be predicted. According to recent studies future stock prices could be 
partly predicted with the historical prices. According to those in favor of efficient mar-
ket hypothesis for example (see Russel & Torbey 2002) the rational price of  a stock is a 
result of the risk investors have to take. According to critics the predictability of stock 
returns is a result of psychological factors.  
 
Researchers have documented ways to successfully predict security returns based on 
past returns. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993: 89) found that momentum shows that move-
ments in individual stock prices over the period of six to twelve months tend to predict 
future movements in the same direction. Momentum means the rate of acceleration of a 
security's price or volume. An economy with strong growth that is likely to continue is 
said to have a lot of momentum. 
 
Shiller (1981: 291) stated that when estimating information efficiency, stock price vola-
tilities can be used to predict the future prices. He found that stock market prices are 
more volatile than could be justified by a simple model in which prices are equal to the 
expected net present value for future dividends. Even Fama (1991: 1581−1583) admit-
ted that stock returns are predictable from past returns.  
 
Several other studies have also shown the ability of easily observed variables to predict 
market returns. For instance Campbell and Shiller (1988: 661−662) found that earnings 
yield can predict market returns, which implies that stock returns can be predicted, in 
violation of the efficient market hypothesis. However, they stated that it is more likely 
that these variables are proxying for variation in the market risk premium. For example 
Bodie et al. (2005: 388) also stated that the predictability of the returns is a risk pre-
mium rather than evidence of market inefficiency. 
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4. BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 
 
Academic research and understanding of finance have evolved much from the days 
when the efficient market hypothesis was widely considered to be proved beyond the 
doubt. A lot of the focus of the academic discussion shifted towards developing models 
of human psychology and its relationship with financial markets, away from economet-
ric analyses of time-series of prices, dividends, and earnings. Nowadays one of the most 
widely researched and examined field of finance is behavioral finance. Behavioral fi-
nance means finance from a broader social science perspective including psychology 
and sociology, which also stands in contradiction with the efficient market hypothesis. 
(Shiller 2003: 83, 90-91.) 
 
Behavioral finance attempts to better understand and explain how emotions and cogni-
tive errors influence investors and the decision-making process. Many researchers be-
lieve that the study of psychology and other social sciences can shed considerable light 
on the efficiency of financial markets as well as explain many stock market anomalies, 
market bubbles, and crashes. Many researchers believe that these humans’ flaws are 
consistent, predictable, and can be exploited for profit.  
 
 
4.1. Outset of the Theory 
 
Behavioral finance started to develop in the 1980’s. Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky had 
a central role in development of the theory. Tversky and Kahneman originally described 
Prospect theory in 1979. They found that, contrary to expected utility theory, people 
placed different weights on gains and losses, and on different ranges of probability. 
They found that individuals are much more distressed by prospective losses than they 
are happy by equivalent gains. Some economists have concluded that investors typically 
consider the loss of 1 dollar twice as painful as the pleasure received from a 1 dollar 
gain. They also found that individuals will respond differently to equivalent situations 
depending on whether it is presented in the context of losses or gains. People are also 
willing to take more risks to avoid losses than to realize gains. Faced with sure gain, 
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most investors are risk-averse, but faced with sure loss, investors become risk-takers. 
(Shefrin 2002: 7–8.) 
 
As it can be seen from the Figure 1 and from the shape of the proposed value function, 
people do not give equal weights for gains and losses. This tendency of exaggerating the 
relative importance of losses is called loss aversion. (Tversky & Kahneman 1991: 
1039.) 
 
 
 
Figure 1. A hypothetical value function (Kahneman et al. 1979: 279). 
 
The pain of a loss also varies. Once investors have suffered a loss, they may be even 
more concerned not to risk a further loss. On the contrary, investors may be more will-
ing to run the risk of a stock market dip after they have experienced a period of substan-
tial gains, just like gamblers (see Thaler & Johnson 1990: 643). Many researchers theo-
rize that the tendency to gamble and to take unnecessary risks is a basic human trait. 
Entertainment and ego appear to be some of the motivations for people's tendency to 
take risks. People also tend to remember their successes, but not their failures, and are 
thereby unjustifiably increasing their confidence. (Brealey et al. 2006: 344–345.) 
 
The assumption of expected utility distinguishes the behavioral approach to asset pric-
ing from the traditional approach. Traditional asset pricing theorists assume that inves-
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tors seek to maximize expected utility. However, the proponents of behavioral finance 
are critical of expected utility as a descriptive theory. They state that people generally 
behave in ways that are inconsistent with expected utility theory. Instead they suggest 
that people behave more in accordance with a psychologically based theory, such as 
Prospect theory and violate expected utility in systematic ways. (Shefrin 2005: 365, 
382.) 
 
The Prospect theory has most probably had more impact than any other behavioral the-
ory on examining finance. Prospect theory can be described as a descriptive framework 
of choice in the face of risk. The theory has three components, a utility function over 
gains and losses, a weighting function, and a mental accounting structure that includes a 
reference point, from which gains and losses are measured in each account. (Shefrin 
2005: 382.) 
 
 
4.2. Information Processing 
 
The premise of behavioral finance is that conventional financial theory ignores how 
people make decisions. A growing number of economists have started to interpret the 
anomalies literature as consistent with several irrationalities that individuals exhibit 
when making complicated decisions. These irrationalities occur due to two main rea-
sons. Firstly, investors do not always process information correctly and therefore infer 
incorrect probability distributions about the future rates of return. Secondly, even if a 
probability distribution is given, investors often make inconsistent or systematically 
suboptimal decisions. (Bodie et al. 2005: 396.) 
 
Errors in information processing can lead investors to misestimate the true probabilities 
of possible events. Several biases like these have been documented such as forecasting 
errors, overconfidence and conservatism. People tend to emphasize recent experience 
compared with prior beliefs when making forecasts. People also tend to make forecasts 
that are too extreme when considering the uncertainty inherent in their information. In 
addition, people tend to overestimate the precision of their beliefs or forecasts and their 
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abilities. Conservatism bias means that investors are too slow to update their beliefs in 
response to recent event. As a result investors might initially underreact to news, which 
lead to that prices will fully reflect new information only gradually. (Bodie et al. 2005: 
397–398.) 
 
4.2.1. Overconfidence 
 
Psychologists have observed that when judging possible future outcomes, individuals 
tend to look back at what has happened in some similar situations. As a result, they 
place too much weight on a very small number of representative occurrences. Another 
systematic bias is overconfidence. People are overconfident of their own abilities, and 
investors, and analysts are particularly overconfident in areas where they have some 
knowledge. Most of the investors think that they are better than average investors, but 
for every winner there must be a loser. Presumably investors are prepared to continue 
trading because each is confident that it is he/she, who is going to make money out of 
the deal, not the other investor. Increasing levels of confidence frequently show no cor-
relation with greater success. For example, money managers, advisors, and investors are 
consistently overconfident in their ability to outperform the market, however, most fail 
to do so. (Brealey et al. 2006: 347.) 
 
One of the most robust behavioral findings is that people are typically overconfident 
about their knowledge when the issues at hand are difficult. Overconfidence also occurs 
in the certainty that people express in their judgements. They consistently underestimate 
the chances of an unlikely event to occur. (Shefrin 2005: 54; Brealey et al. 2006: 347.) 
 
4.2.2. Over- and Underreaction 
 
There are two families of pervasive regularities that are apparently inconsistent with 
weak and semi-strong form market efficiency, namely underreaction and overreaction. 
The underreaction evidence shows that security prices underreact to news such as earn-
ings announcements. If the news is good, prices keep trending up after the initial posi-
tive reaction. On the other hand, if the news is bad, prices keep trending down after the 
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initial negative reaction. In other words, current news has power in predicting not just 
the returns on the announcement of this news, but also future returns, when the news is 
already stale. The momentum evidence is closely related to underreaction, since the 
positive autocorrelation of returns over relatively short horizons may reflect slow incor-
poration of news into stock prices. (Shleifer 2000: 112.) 
 
The overreaction evidence shows that, over longer horizons of three to five years, secu-
rity prices overreact to consistent patterns of news pointing in the same direction, i.e. 
securities that have had a long record of good news tend to become overpriced and have 
low average returns afterwards. Securities with good performance, however, receive 
high valuations and these valuations return to mean on average. (Shleifer 2000: 112–
113.) 
 
The cross-sectional overreaction and underreaction evidence shows rather reliable regu-
larities. These regularities are difficult to reconcile with the efficient market hypothesis. 
In the case of overreaction, there is considerable evidence inconsistent with the funda-
mental risk explanation and no direct evidence to support it. In the case of underreac-
tion, an efficient markets explanation has not even been proposed. (Shleifer 2000: 127.) 
 
4.2.3. Other Biases 
 
The behavioral decision literature identifies many systematic errors to which people are 
vulnerable. Most important to asset pricing theory is representativeness. Representa-
tiveness induces naive individual investors to indulge to extrapolation bias. Overconfi-
dence amplifies representativeness based errors and also induces to underestimate risk. 
When psychologists use the term heuristics they mean the rule of thumb. When they use 
the word judgement they mean assessment. The major finding in heuristics and biases is 
that when people form judgements and rely on heuristics, these heuristics bias and 
judgements produce systematic errors. (Shefrin 2005: 15, 449.) 
 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974: 33) defined the behavioral heuristic known as represen-
tativeness, or the tendency of experimental subjects to view events as typical or repre-
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sentative of some specific class and also to ignore the laws of probability. An important 
manifestation of the representativeness heuristic is that people think that they see pat-
terns truly random sequences. A person who follows the heuristic evaluates the prob-
ability of an uncertain event, or a sample, by the degree to which it is similar in its es-
sential properties to its parent population and by the degree to which it reflects the sali-
ent features of the process by which it is generated.  
 
Psychologists contend that people rely on particular heuristics to form judgements. Rep-
resentativeness is one of the most prevalent heuristics and it plays a prominent role in 
financial forecasts. Representativeness involves overreliance on stereotypes and it leads 
people to form probability judgements that systematically violate Bayes rule. People 
who rely on representativeness rather than Bayes rule have different probability beliefs 
and it also leads people to make predictions that are insufficiently regressive relative to 
the mean. (Shefrin 2005: 23, 38.) 
 
Another phenomenon is also presented in psychology literature, namely conservation-
ism. It is defined as the slow updating. Individuals update their posteriors in the right 
direction, but by too little relative to the rational Bayesian benchmark. In particular 
people tend to underweight useful statistical evidence relative to the less useful evidence 
used to form their priors. In other words when investors get a good piece of earnings 
news, they act as if part of the shock will be reversed in the next period. (Edwards 1968: 
17−18; Shleifer 2000: 113, 227–228; Barberis & Thaler 2002: 39.) 
 
Conservatism occurs for example when a company announces surprisingly good earn-
ings. Investors react insufficiently to the announcement and push the price up too little. 
Since the price is too low, subsequent returns will be higher on average, thereby gener-
ating both post-earnings announcement drift and momentum. After a series of good 
earnings announcements, representativeness causes people to overreact and push the 
price up too high. The reason is that after many periods of good earnings, the law of 
small numbers leads investors to believe that this is a firm with particularly high earn-
ings growth, and hence to forecast high earnings in the future. (Barberis et al. 2002: 
38−39.) 
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A common finding in behavioral studies is that people are heterogeneous. People hold 
different beliefs, differ in their tolerance for risk and in their levels of patience. These 
differences can be important and affect both prices and trading volume. Individual dif-
ferences are typically large. People are different in the way they form judgements. Some 
form judgements as if they rely on heuristics such as representativeness, while other 
form judgements as if they use Bayes rule. The degree of heterogeneity can be wide 
even among those who rely on representativeness and even investors in investment 
firms show heterogeneous behavior. Representativeness causes heterogeneity to have a 
time varying structure. Some of the heterogeneity can be explained by the level of ex-
perience and the presence of incentives. (Shefrin 2005: 44, 57, 450.) 
 
Some studies also document that investors exhibit also a pronounced home bias. French 
and Poterba (1991: 222) reported that investors in the U.S., Japan and U.K. allocate 
92,2 %, 95,7 % and 92 % of their overall equity investment, respectively, to domestic 
equities. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001: 614−615) also found that investors in Finland 
are much more likely to hold and trade stocks of Finnish firms, which are located close 
to them geographically, which use their mother tongue in company reports, and whose 
chief executive shares their cultural background. Investors prefer local or familiar stocks 
even though there may be no rational reason to prefer the local stock over other compa-
rable stocks that the investor is unfamiliar with.  
 
 
4.3. Two Major Foundations of Behavioral Finance 
 
At the general level, behavioral finance is the study of human fallibility in competitive 
markets. It does not just simply deal with an observation that people are biased, con-
fused, and irrational. This observation is uncontroversial, although understanding the 
precise nature of biases and confusions is an enormously difficult task. Behavioral fi-
nance goes beyond this uncontroversial observation and places the biased, the irrational 
and the confused people into competitive financial markets, in which at least some arbi-
trageurs are fully rational. Behavioral finance then examines what happens to prices and 
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other dimensions of market performance, when the different types of investors trade 
with each other. (Shleifer 2000:24–25.) 
 
As a study of human fallibility in competitive markets, the theory of behavioral finance 
rests in two major foundations. The first is limited arbitrage, which suggests that arbi-
trage in the real-world securities markets is far from perfect. Many securities do not 
have perfect or even good substitutes, which makes arbitrage fundamentally risky. Even 
if good substitutes are available, arbitrage remains risky and limited, because prices do 
not converge to fundamental values instantaneously. The fact that arbitrage is limited 
helps to explain why prices do not necessarily react to information by the right amount 
and why prices may react to non-information expressed in uninformed changes in the 
demand. Limited arbitrage, thus explains, why markets may remain inefficient when 
perturbed by noise trader demands, but it does not tell us much about the exact form that 
inefficiency might take. For that, we need the second foundation of behavioral finance, 
namely investor sentiment: the theory of how real-world investors actually form their 
beliefs and valuations and more generally their demands for securities. Combined with 
limited arbitrage, investor sentiment theory may help generate precise predictions about 
the behavior of security prices and returns. (Shleifer 2000: 24.) 
 
Both of these elements are necessary. If arbitrage is unlimited, then arbitrageurs ac-
commodate the uninformed shifts in demand as well as make sure that news is incorpo-
rated into prices quickly and correctly. Markets then remain efficient although many 
investors are irrational. Without investor sentiment, there are no disturbances to effi-
cient prices and so prices do not deviate from efficiency. A behavioral theory, thus, re-
quires both an irrational disturbance and limited arbitrage. (Shleifer 2000: 25.) 
 
4.3.1. Limits to Arbitrage 
 
Arbitrage plays a critical role in the analysis of securities markets, because it brings 
prices to fundamental values and keeps markets efficient. The central argument of be-
havioral finance states that, in contrast to the efficient market hypothesis, real-world 
arbitrage is risky and therefore limited. Securities do not necessarily have close substi-
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tutes as is expected in EMH. There might not be a riskless hedge for the arbitrageur. If 
an arbitrageur is risk-averse, his/her interest in such risky arbitrage is limited. With a 
finite risk-bearing capacity of arbitrageurs as a group, their aggregate ability to bring 
prices of broad groups of securities into line is limited as well. Another risk for arbitra-
geur comes from unpredictability of the resale price in the future, i.e. the mispricing 
becomes worse before it disappears. Arbitrage is also limited in cases where arbitra-
geurs need to worry about financing and maintaining their position, when price diver-
gence can become worse before it gets better. This is called a noise trader risk. Noise 
trader risk must be borne by any arbitrageur with a short time horizon and it limits 
his/her willingness to bet against the noise trader. Noise trader risk appears also to be a 
good explanation of price divergences between fundamentally identical securities. 
(Shleifer 2000: 13–14, 29.) 
 
Arbitrage is extremely limited even in an environment that is very close to efficient 
markets. In more complicated environments it is even more limited. The theoretical pre-
sumption for market efficiency based on arbitrage simply does not exist once the reali-
ties of real-world arbitrage begin to be modeled seriously. The potential costs of arbi-
trage are often underestimated. An important reason for that arbitrage is limited is that 
movements in investor sentiment are in part unpredictable. Therefore arbitrageurs bet-
ting against mispricing run the risk that at least in the short horizon, investor sentiment 
becomes more extreme and prices move even further away from the fundamental value. 
As a consequence arbitrage positions often lose money in the short run. That is why 
arbitrageurs need long horizons to be able to bet successfully on slow-moving market 
mispricing. (Barberis, Shleifer & Vishny1997: 2; Shleifer 2000: 52.) 
 
It is apparent that the existence of irrational investors would not by itself be sufficient to 
render capital markets inefficient. The arbitrageurs would take advantage of the profit 
opportunities and they would be expected to push prices back to their proper values. 
Behavioral biases would not matter for stock pricing, if rational investors could per-
fectly profit from the mistakes of behavioral investors. Behavioral advocates argue, 
though, that in practice, several factors limit the ability to profit from mispricing. (Bodie 
et al. 2005: 396–399.) 
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4.3.1.1. The Closed End Fund Puzzle 
 
One example of limited arbitrage is a closed end fund puzzle. This puzzle refers to the 
fact that closed end mutual funds, i.e. the funds that hold portfolios of other securities 
and have a fixed number of shares that are themselves traded in the market, often sell at 
prices that are different from the market values of the portfolios they hold. Three expla-
nations are often presented: agency costs, tax liabilities, and illiquidity of assets. 
(Shleifer 2000: 26, 53.) 
 
When enough stocks in addition to closed end funds are affected by the same investor 
sentiment, risk from this sentiment cannot be diversified and it is therefore priced. The 
noise trader approach to the closed end fund puzzle explains why fund mispricing rela-
tive to its portfolio is not eliminated by arbitrage. Substantial evidence has been found 
that investor sentiment and especially individual investor sentiment influences the 
prices of closed end funds. (Shleifer 2000: 61, 89.) 
 
4.3.1.2. Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets 
 
Noise is described as price and volume fluctuations in the market that can confuse one's 
interpretation of market direction. Noise trader risk is a form of market risk associated 
with the investment decisions of noise traders. Noise traders attempt to take advantage 
of market noise by entering buy and sell transactions without the use of fundamental 
data. In general, the shorter the time frame, the more difficult it is to separate the mean-
ingful market movements from the noise. The higher the volatility in market prices for a 
particular security, the greater the associated noise trader risk. Behavioral finance re-
searchers have attempted to isolate this risk in order to explain and capitalize upon the 
sentiment of the majority of investors. For example, if the noise trader risk for a particu-
lar stock is high, an issuance of good news related to a particular company may influ-
ence more noise traders to buy the stock, artificially inflating its market value. (Shleifer 
2000: 33, 51.) 
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Noise traders form erroneous beliefs about the future distribution of returns on a risky 
asset. They may be subjected for example to behavioral biases in processing informa-
tion and forecasting returns. Alternatively they may incorrectly perceive the riskiness of 
return, perhaps because they are overconfident. Noise traders select their portfolios on 
the basis of such incorrect beliefs. In response it is optimal for arbitrageurs to exploit 
noise traders’ misperceptions. Overall, noise trader risk is only the beginning of the long 
story of the costs of what traditional finance has come to call arbitrage. (Shleifer 2000: 
33, 51.) 
 
Risk created by the unpredictability of investor sentiment significantly reduces the at-
tractiveness of arbitrage. Noise trading can lead to a large divergence between market 
prices and fundamental values. Opinions of noise traders are to some extent unpredict-
able and arbitrage requires bearing the risk that their misperceptions become even more 
extreme in the future than they are now. More generally speaking, unpredictability 
seems to be a general property of the behavior of irrational investors. (Shleifer 2000: 
52.) 
 
4.3.1.3. Professional Arbitrage 
 
Commonly arbitrage is conducted by relatively few professionals, highly specialized 
investors, who combine their knowledge with resources of outside investors to take 
large positions. The fundamental feature of such arbitrage is that brains and resources 
are separated by an agency relationship. For instance, mutual and pension funds manage 
money for millions of individual investors. Hedge funds take money from wealthy indi-
viduals, banks endowments and other investors with only a limited knowledge of indi-
vidual markets and invest it using highly specialized knowledge. (Shleifer 2000: 89.) 
 
Much of the money in financial markets is allocated by professional managers of pen-
sion and mutual funds on behalf of individual investors and corporations. Professional 
money managers are, of course, people as well and also subject to the same biases as 
individual investors. That is why it is not enough to refer to irrationality of individual 
 39 
investors, it must be also explained, why financial institutions do not compete away the 
profit opportunities that may arise. (Shleifer 2000: 11–12; Brealey et al. 2006: 347.) 
 
4.3.2. Investor Sentiment 
 
Sentiment distinguishes the behavioral approach to asset pricing from the traditional 
approach. Proponents of behavioral finance treat sentiment as a major determinant of 
market prices, stemming from systematic errors that investors commit. Proponents of 
traditional finance treat sentiment as minor and they assume that investors are free from 
biases. Whereas behavioral asset pricing theorists attribute observed phenomena to sen-
timent, traditional asset pricing theorists attribute observed pricing phenomena to fun-
damental risk or time varying risk aversion. (Shefrin 2005: 365.) 
 
Sentiment measures the degree of excessive optimism or pessimism among investors, 
although, sentiment is more complex than that. Rather, sentiment pertains to the entire 
distribution of investors’ errors. Zero sentiment corresponds to the case of zero errors at 
the level of the market. (Shefrin 2005: 219.) 
 
Like mentioned earlier, according to the defense of the efficient market hypothesis, irra-
tional investors trade randomly. However, psychological evidence shows precisely that 
people do not deviate from rationality randomly, but rather most deviate in the system-
atic way. This problem becomes more severe only when the noise traders behave so-
cially and follow each others’ mistakes by listening to rumors. Investor sentiment re-
flects the common judgement of errors made by a substantial number of investors, 
rather than uncorrelated random mistakes. (Shleifer 2000: 11–12.) 
 
To describe investors, whose preferences and beliefs conform to the psychological evi-
dence rather than the normative economic model, a number of terms have been used. 
Beliefs based on heuristic rather than Bayesian rationality are sometimes called investor 
sentiment. The investors, who do not behave rationally according to the normative 
model are described as unsophisticated or noise traders. Irrational exuberance is one 
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aspect of sentiment and it suggests investors’ naively extrapolating the upward market 
trend into the future. (Shefrin 2005: 11–12, 324.) 
 
Sentiment is a stochastic process that describes the overall market error. The term sen-
timent is synonymous with error, either at the level of the individual investor or at the 
level of the market. Sentiment has sometimes a simple structure, as when investors are 
uniformly optimistic or pessimistic. However, when investors exhibit considerable het-
erogeneity, sentiment is typically complex. Behavioral asset pricing theorists often 
model sentiment as a scalar variable, such as the bias to the mean of a particular distri-
bution. In general, sentiment is not a scalar but a stochastic process. It evolves accord-
ing to a distribution that interacts with fundamental variables. The prices of some assets 
in the market may feature excessive optimism while the prices of other assets feature 
excessive pessimism. (Shefrin 2005: 6, 450.) 
 
When proponents of behavioral finance talk of sentiment they are talking about the ag-
gregate errors of investors that are designated in security prices. A formal definition of a 
sentiment variable  is based on two terms. The first term, and the more important one 
is the likelihood ratio PR(x1)/(x1). The second term involves the value of R that arises 
from the equation, when all investors hold objectively correct beliefs. This value is 
called (of R) R,. (Shefrin 2005: 206−207.) It can be defined: 
 
(3) 
 
 
 
The variable  reflects two of the deviations that can arise, because of investor errors. 
The first deviation stems from the beliefs of the representative investor, what one might 
call the beliefs of the market, relative to objective beliefs. The second deviation stems 
from the representative investor’s equilibrium time discount factor, relative to the situa-
tion when all investors hold objectively correct beliefs. When all investors hold objec-
tively correct beliefs,  = 1. The sentiment function can be defined by  = ln(). (She-
frin 2005: 206−207.) Formally,  
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(4) 
 
 
 
4.4. Investor Irrationality 
 
Psychologists working in the area of behavioral decision-making have produced much 
evidence that people do not behave as if they have von Neumann-Morgenstern prefer-
ences and do not form judgements in accordance with Bayesian principles. Rather, they 
systematically behave in a manner different from both. Notably, behavioral psycholo-
gists have advanced theories that address the causes and effects associated with these 
systematic deviations. The behavioral counterpart to von Neumann-Morgenstern theory 
is known as Prospect theory. The behavioral counterpart to Bayesian theory is known as 
heuristics and biases. Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility describes a utility that has the 
expected utility property: the agent is indifferent between receiving a given bundle or a 
gamble with the same expected value. (Shefrin 2005: 2.) 
 
Rationality means two things. Firstly, when investors receive new information, they 
update their beliefs correctly, in the manner described by Bayes’ law. Secondly, given 
their beliefs, investors make choices that are normatively acceptable, in the sense that 
they are consistent with Savage’s notion of Subjective Expected utility (SEU). SEU 
combines two distinct subjective concepts: a personal utility function and a personal 
probability analysis based on Bayesian probability theory. (Barberis et al. 2002: 2.) 
 
It is difficult to sustain the situation that investors are fully rational. Many investors 
react to irrelevant information and they trade on noise rather than information. For in-
stance, investors may follow the advice of investor gurus, fail to diversify and sell win-
ning stocks and hold on to loosing stocks. In short, investors do not pursue the passive 
strategies expected of uninformed market participants by the efficient market hypothe-
sis. Economists’ belief to investors’ rationality is the most powerful in the field of fi-
nance, because there wrong decisions lead to immediate punishment of wrong decisions 
and mistakes. (Shleifer 2000: 10, 14–16.) 
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Yet, people trade for both cognitive and emotional reasons. They trade because they 
think they have information when they have nothing but noise, and they trade because 
trading can bring them the joy of pride. Trading brings pride when decisions turn out 
well, but it brings regret when decisions turn out to be bad. Investors try to avoid the 
pain of regret by avoiding the realization of losses, employing investment advisors as 
scapegoats, and avoiding stocks of companies with low reputations. 
 
Investors look more askance at losses, if the investment has not been profitable in the 
past. If the investment on the other hand has been profitable, investors are more eager to 
make even riskier investments. Investors often believe that what has happened in the 
past will happen also in the future. Beliefs about probability are wrong. Many people 
have a hard time accepting some facts despite mathematical proof. People often see or-
der where it does not exist and interpret accidental success to be the result of skill. In-
vestors believe that they are better than average investors and that makes them act irra-
tionally. People have limited capacity to process information; in addition people are 
impressionable to make mistakes and to trust other peoples’ opinions. (Russel et al. 
2002; Brealey et al. 2003: 358–360.) 
 
Investors’ deviations from the maxims of economic rationality have turned out to be 
highly pervasive and systematic (Shleifer 2000: 10). According to Kahneman and Riepe 
(1998: 52−54) people deviate from standard decision-making in a number of fundamen-
tal areas. Three broad groups can be formed from these areas:   
 
1) attitude towards risk 
2) non-Bayesian expectation formation 
3) sensitivity of decision making to the framing of problems 
 
4.4.1. Attitude towards Risk 
 
Proponents of behavioral finance assume that psychological phenomena prevent most 
investors from being fully rational. Instead, investors are assumed to be imperfectly 
rational. Imperfectly rational investors are not uniformly averse to risk. In some circum-
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stances they act as if they are risk seeking. Moreover, imperfectly rational investors do 
not rely on optimal statistical procedures. Instead, they rely on heuristics that predispose 
their beliefs to bias. (Shefrin 2005: 3.) 
 
When assessing risky gambles, people do not look at the levels of final wealth they can 
attain, but at gains and losses relative to some reference point, which may vary from 
situation to situation. Such references are helpful for thinking about a number of prob-
lems in finance, and they were first described by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) in 
Prospect theory. (Shleifer 2000: 11.) 
 
One of these problems is reluctance of the investors to sell stocks that lose value (Odean 
1998: 1775−1776). Another is investors’ aversion to holding stocks more generally, 
known as the premium puzzle (Benartzi & Thaler 1995: 75). In premium puzzle histori-
cal difference between the return on equities and the risk free rate has been judged too 
big to be explained within traditional asset pricing models of expected utility maximiza-
tion. An explanation offered by Shleifer (2000: 11) and by Thaler (2005: 2) comes from 
the psychology of decision-making, namely loss aversion, which is the tendency to 
weight losses much more heavily than gains. Another explanation is narrow framing, 
which is the tendency to consider returns over brief periods of time rather than long run.  
 
4.4.2. Non-Bayesian Expectation Formation 
 
Bayes rule states that if D and F are two events, then P(F|D) = P(D|F)P(F)/(D). The rep-
resentativeness hypothesis has many implications, and one of the most important ones is 
that people form probability judgements that violate Bayes rule. In particular, reliance 
on representativeness will lead people to underweight the prior probability P(F) and 
overweight the conditional probability P(D|F). (Shefrin 2005: 16.) 
 
Individuals systematically violate Bayes rule and other maxims of probability theory in 
their predictions of uncertain outcomes (Kahneman & Tversky 1973).  The essence of 
the Bayesian approach is to provide a mathematical rule explaining how existing beliefs 
should be changed new evidence. For instance, people often predict future uncertain 
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events by taking a short history of data, and asking what broader picture this history is 
representative of. In focusing on such representativeness, they often do not take into 
account the possibility that the recent history is generated by a chance rather than by a 
model they are constructing.  
 
Such heuristics are useful in many life situations, for example, they help people to iden-
tify patterns in the data, but they also may mislead the investors. For instance, investors 
may extrapolate short past histories of rapid earnings growth of some companies too far 
into the future and therefore overprice these companies. Such overreaction lowers future 
returns as past growth rates fail to repeat themselves and prices adjust to more plausible 
valuations. (Shefrin 2005: 11.) 
 
People typically give too much weight to recent experience and extrapolate recent 
trends. They tend to become more optimistic when the market goes up and more pessi-
mistic when the market goes down. Many believe that when high percentages of par-
ticipants become overly optimistic or pessimistic about the future, it is a signal that the 
opposite scenario will occur. However, investors who violate Bayes rule and do not 
learn quickly enough will typically vanish in the long run. (Shefrin 2005: 237.) 
 
4.4.3. Decision-making and Framing 
 
Even if information processing was perfect investors might make less than fully rational 
decisions using that information. These behavioral biases emerge, depending on how 
investors frame choices and questions of risk versus return and therefore make risk-
return trade-offs, i.e. framing influences decision-making. (Shleifer 2000: 11; Bodie et 
al. 2005: 398.) 
 
Psychologists have proven that individuals who make decisions which turn out badly 
have more regret when decision was more unconventional. People also tend to feel sor-
row and grief after having made an error in judgement. Investors deciding whether to 
sell a security are typically emotionally affected by whether the security was bought for 
more or less than the current price. One theory is that investors avoid selling stocks that 
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have gone down in order to avoid the pain and regret of having made a bad investment. 
The embarrassment of having to report the loss, for example, to the accountants may 
also contribute to the tendency not to sell the losing investments. Some researchers 
theorize that investors follow the crowd and conventional wisdom to avoid the possibil-
ity of feeling regret in the event that their decisions prove to be incorrect. (Bodie et al. 
2005: 399.) 
 
Many investors find it easier to buy a popular stock and rationalize it going down since 
everyone else owned it too. Buying a stock with a bad image is harder to rationalize if it 
goes down. For example, when buying a blue-chip portfolio that turns down is not as 
painful as experiencing the same losses on an unknown start-up firm. Any losses on the 
blue-chip stocks can be more easily attributed to bad luck rather than bad decision-
making, and case less regret. (Bodie et al. 2005: 399.) 
 
Psychographics describe psychological characteristics of people and are particularly 
relevant to each individual investor's strategy and risk tolerance. An investor’s back-
ground and past experiences can play a significant role in the decisions an individual 
makes during the investment process. For instance, women tend to be more risk averse 
than men and passive investors have typically became wealthy without much risk while 
active investors have typically become wealthy by earning it themselves.  
 
People often see other people's decisions as the result of disposition, but they see their 
own choices as rational. Investors frequently trade on information they believe to be 
superior and relevant when, in fact, it is not and is fully discounted by the market. This 
results in frequent trading and consistently high volumes in financial markets that many 
researchers find puzzling. On one side of each speculative trade is a participant, who 
believes he or she has superior information and on the other side is another participant 
who believes that his/her information is superior. Yet they cannot both be right. 
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4.5. Models of Behavioral Finance 
 
There is no single unifying model in behavioral finance. In many behavioral models of 
securities markets there are two types of investors: rational arbitrageurs, who are senti-
ment-free and irrational traders prone to exogenous sentiment. These two groups com-
pete in the market and set prices and expected returns. Nonetheless, arbitrageurs are 
limited in various ways as mentioned before. These limits come from short horizons or 
costs and risks of trading and short selling. Thus, prices are not always at their funda-
mental values. In such models, mispricing arises out of the combination of two factors: 
a change in sentiment on the part of the irrational traders, and a limit to arbitrage from 
the rational ones. (De Long, Shleifer, Summers & Waldmann 1990: 706–709; Shleifer 
2000: 25.)  
 
Researchers in behavioral finance have been working to build an alternative behavioral 
model based on two basic assumptions. According to first assumption, investors are 
subject to sentiment. Investor sentiment is a belief about future cash flows and invest-
ment risks that are not justified by the facts available. The second assumption is that 
betting against sentimental investors is costly and risky. And so, rational investors, or 
arbitrageurs, are not as aggressive in forcing prices to fundamentals as the standard 
model would suggest. (Baker et al. 2006: 1.) 
 
According to Baker et al. (2006: 2−3, 25) the strongest tests of the effects of investor 
sentiment involve return predictability. One approach to measure investor sentiment and 
quantity of its effects is called bottom up approach. It uses biases in individual investor 
psychology, such as overconfidence, representativeness, and conservatism, to explain 
how individual investors underreact or overreact to past returns or fundamentals.  
 
4.5.1. Feedback Model 
 
A price-to-price feedback theory is one of the oldest theories about financial markets. 
When speculative prices go up, creating successes to some investors, this may attract 
public attention, promote word-of-mouth enthusiasm, and heighten expectations for 
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further price increases. This process increases investor demand and generates an other 
round of price increases. If the feedback is not interrupted, it may produce a speculative 
bubble, in which high expectations for further price increases support very high current 
prices. The high prices are ultimately not sustainable, since they are high only because 
of expectations of further price increases, and so the bubble eventually bursts, and 
prices come falling down. The same feedback may also produce a negative bubble, 
downward price movements propelling further downward price movements, promoting 
word-of mouth pessimism, until the market reaches an unsustainably low level. (Shiller 
2003: 91.) 
 
In so-called price bubbles prices go up without much news just because noise traders 
are chasing the trend. Noise traders in price bubbles react to past price changes, as op-
posed to particular news. An example from such behavior is Internet stocks in 1998. 
Companies providing Internet related services, such as Yahoo!, Ebay and Amazon.com, 
have often very few assets, little market power and negative earnings. During 1998, 
however, they kept on rising in price and acquired market capitalizations in the tens of 
billions of dollars. Noise traders’ behavior in such bubbles can be described by positive 
feedback trading. Positive feedback investors buy securities after prices rise, and sell 
after prices fall. It can result, for example, from extrapolative expectations about prices. 
The feedback theory was supported by research in cognitive psychology, which shows 
that the human judgements of the probability of future events show systematic biases. 
(Shleifer 2000: 154–155; Shiller 2003: 93–94.)  
 
 
4.7. Controversy between Efficient Market Hypothesis and Behavioral Finance 
 
Because the two main theories that are presented more detailed contradict at some ex-
tent, some controversy can be seen in this thesis. It is not the purpose to come to a con-
clusion, which one is truer than the other, but the comprehensive picture is given from 
both of the theories.  
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Traditional asset pricing theory and behavioral asset pricing theory share a common 
framework. The features that are different between these theories are the differing as-
sumptions and results. Traditional asset pricing theory assumes that prices are set as if 
investors have correct beliefs about the underlying stochastic process governing returns 
and have preferences that conform to expected utility theory. In contrast, behavioral 
asset pricing theory assumes that investors are subject to systematic psychologically 
induced errors and have preferences that violate the assumptions of expected utility the-
ory. (Shefrin 2005: 449.) 
 
According to Bodie et al. (2005: 384–386), there are three issues that together imply 
that the debate whether efficient market hypothesis is true or not, will probably never 
end. The first one is the magnitude issue. Everybody could agree that stock prices are 
very close to fair values and that only managers of large portfolios can earn enough 
trading profits to make the exploitation of minor mispricing worth the effort. According 
to this view, the actions of intellectual investment managers are the driving force behind 
the constant progress of setting market prices to fair levels. In this view, more consistent 
would be to ask how efficient are markets rather than are markets efficient. The second 
is the selection bias issue meaning that the outcomes we are able to observe have been 
preselected in favor of failed attempts. On that account, we cannot fairly evaluate the 
true ability of portfolio managers to generate winning stock market strategies. The third 
is the lucky event issue. There is an equal likelihood of winning or loosing the bet when 
tossing a coin. Under the hypothesis that any stock is fairly priced given all available 
information, any bet on a stock really is a coin toss. Although, if many investors using a 
variety of schemes make fair bets, some of those investors will be lucky and win a ma-
jority of these bets. For every big winner there may be many big losers. The proper test 
would be to see, whether the successful investors can repeat their performance in an-
other time period. 
 
The proponents of market efficiency hold that there are enough well-informed investors 
to seize all unexploited profit opportunities. The efficient market hypothesis emphasizes 
that arbitrage rapidly eliminates any profit opportunities and drive market prices back to 
fair value. According to the evidence from behavioral decision-making studies people 
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learn slowly. Behavioral finance specialists may admit that easy profits do not exist, but 
argue that because arbitrage is costly, and sometimes slow-working, deviations from 
fair value may persist. The question remains whether there are enough quick learners to 
eliminate mispricing in the financial markets. (Shefrin 2002: 80; Brealey et al. 2006: 
349). 
 
Bodie et al. (2005: 405) established that markets are efficient. They also stated that 
markets are competitive enough to state that only differentially superior information or 
insight will earn money. In the end, it is likely that the margin of superiority that any 
professional manager can add is so scarce that the statistician will not easily be able to 
detect it. Shiller (2003: 96) on the other hand disputed that theoretical models of effi-
cient financial markets that represent investors as rational optimizers cannot be more 
than metaphors for the world around us. According to him it is unreasonable to claim 
that everyone knows how to solve complex stochastic optimization models.  
 
Concerning the strength of the behavioral critique, there is considerable debate among 
financial economists. Critics argue that it is too easy to reach for psychology text every 
time behavior that cannot be explained is observed. It is easy to find caprices in investor 
behavior that will explain with hindsight any of the market anomalies, but the useful-
ness of behavioral finance is going to depend on whether it can predict future mispric-
ing. 
 
 Behavioral finance is still in its infancy. Yet, it has presented financial economics with 
a new theory, a new set of explanations of empirical regularities, as well as the new set 
of predictions. The critique of full rationality in investor decision-making is well-taken, 
but the extent to which limited rationality impacts on asset pricing is controversial. It is 
still too early to judge behavioral approach, specifically, which behavioral models will 
last and become tools of financial analysts. (Shleifer 2000: 27; Bodie et al. 2005: 
400−401; Brealey et al. 2006: 347.) 
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5. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Edmans et al. (2006: 2–3) introduced a novel mood variable to investigate the effects of 
investor sentiment on asset prices. They argued that a mood variable has to satisfy three 
key characteristics to rationalize studying its link with stock returns. Firstly, the given 
variable must drive mood in a substantial and unambiguous way, so that its effect is 
powerful enough to appear in asset prices. Secondly, the variable must impact the mood 
of a large proportion of the population, so that it is likely to affect enough investors. 
Thirdly, the effect has to be correlated across the majority of individuals in the country.  
 
The data of this thesis consist of stock market indices and the results of international ice 
hockey games. Ice hockey is assumed to meet the conditions mentioned above, because 
only such countries are being studied, where ice hockey truly is the number one sport. 
 
 
5.1. Data Description 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the stock market reaction to the sudden 
changes in investor mood. A strong link between investor mood and sport has already 
been discovered. Therefore, the results of ice hockey games are used to investigate the 
mood changes of the investors. The main contribution is to study a variable, interna-
tional ice hockey results, which has particularly attractive properties as a measure of 
mood. Especially in the chosen countries ice hockey can be referred as a national sport. 
Extensive psychological evidence also shows that sport in general has a significant ef-
fect on mood. Also the growth and professionalization of sport has driven changes in 
consumption and TV-viewing figures. For example, during the final game Finland 
against Canada in the latest ice hockey World Championship in 2007, there were about 
1,8 million TV viewers in Finland. That is about 35 per cent of Finland’s population. 
(Suomen Tietotoimisto 2007.) 
 
According to government regulation, the most important sport events should be broad-
casted live in Finland. World Championships of men’s ice hockey are one of them as 
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well as the Olympic Games and men’s ice hockey in Olympics. For example, Formula 1 
is not included to these sports mentioned above. Thus, the importance of ice hockey can 
be seen. (Valtioneuvosto 2007.) 
 
5.1.1. Stock Indices 
 
A stock market index is a listing of stocks as well as a statistic reflecting the composite 
value of its components. It is used as a tool to represent the characteristics of its compo-
nent stocks, all of which bear some commonality such as trading on the same stock ex-
change or belonging to the same industry. Stock market indices can be classified in 
many ways. A broad-base index, which is used in this thesis, represents the performance 
of a whole stock market – and by proxy, reflects investor sentiment on the state of the 
economy. Broad-base indices are the most regularly quoted market indices including the 
largest listed companies on a nation’s largest stock exchange. The market indices that 
are used in this thesis are obtained from Datastream and the returns are computed using 
the price index.  
 
The indices used in this thesis are from Czech Republic, Finland, Russia and Sweden. In 
Czech Republic, the broad-base market index is the PX index, which is an index of ma-
jor stocks traded on the Prague Stock Exchange. It consists of 50 companies traded on 
the Prague Stock Exchange. The OMX Helsinki 25 is a stock market index for Helsinki 
Stock Exchange. It is a market value weighted index consisting of the 25 most-traded 
stock classes. The RTS Index is an index of 50 companies that trade on the RTS Stock 
Exchange in Moscow. The OMX Stockholm 30 is a stock market index for the Stock-
holm Stock Exchange. It is a market value weighted index consisting of the 30 most-
traded stock classes. Also world index is used to compare it with the country based in-
dices. (Russian Trading System 2007; The Nordic Exchange 2007; The Prague Stock 
Exchange 2007.)  
 
Indices from each country form a time-series between 1.1.1998 – 26.6.2007. The aver-
age time series has 2 473 trading days, which gives a total of 9 892 daily return observa-
tions.  
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5.1.2. Ice Hockey 
 
Four major ice hockey countries from Europe are examined: Czech Republic, Finland, 
Russia and Sweden. One of the main reasons why to include these countries is that these 
countries play against each other in Euro Hockey Tournament. These countries have 
also succeeded well in international tournaments, and are also ranked among the best ice 
hockey countries in Europe and worldwide. The third reason is that ice hockey has a 
really important position in these countries. It can be classified as a national sport in 
Finland and in Czech Republic, and it is very highly appreciated also in Russia and 
Sweden. As the importance of ice hockey increases in a particular country, the more 
significant effects may be obtained. Fro example Edmans et al. (2006) used in their ice 
hockey data countries such as Switzerland and Germany, in which soccer plays the 
more important role than ice hockey. That is why they are left out from the data of this 
thesis. 
 
The most succeeded ice hockey countries ever have been Canada, Russia (also the 
USSR), Sweden, Czech Republic (also Czechoslovakia), USA, and Finland. The reason 
why Canada and The United States are not included in the sample is that NHL (National 
Hockey League) plays more important role in those countries than international ice 
hockey games and therefore the results would not be comparable. The annual men's Ice 
Hockey World Championships are less important to North Americans, also because 
they coincide with the Stanley Cup playoffs. (International Ice Hockey Federation 
2007.) 
 
The most important international ice hockey games are included in the sample. The ice 
hockey games are Olympic, World Championship and World Cup games. World Cham-
pionship results are from year 2001 to year 2007. Also the results of the Olympic 
Games from years 2002 and 2006 are included. In addition the results from the World 
Cup from year 2004 are included.  
 
The ice hockey data consist altogether of 10 tournaments and 227 games which are di-
vided as follows: Czech Republic 57 games, Finland 58 games, Russia 51 games and 
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Sweden 61 games. The total amount of wins is 152 and losses 75. The amount of games 
played by each country depends on how well they have succeeded in the tournaments. 
The elimination games include altogether 80 games, which are divided as follows: 
Czech Republic 18 games, Finland 22 games, Russia 18 games and Sweden 22 games. 
The data of the results of the ice hockey games is collected from the web pages of Inter-
national Ice Hockey Federation, Wikipedia and World Cup of Hockey.  
 
 
5.2. Hypotheses 
 
The first research hypothesis is formulated in accordance with the literature of psychol-
ogy that suggests that wins are associated with good mood and losses with bad mood. 
According to this earlier literature, changes in investor mood also affect the economic 
behavior. Evidence can be found that sport outcomes have an impact on subjects’ opti-
mism or pessimism, not only about their own abilities, but life in general. This suggests 
that ice hockey results might affect investors’ views about future stock prices. 
 
H1: Wins in ice hockey games lead to a positive stock market reaction and losses in ice 
hockey games lead to a negative stock market reaction. 
 
The psychology literature also documents a significant difference in the behavior of fans 
following wins and losses. Especially, while an increase in heart attacks, crimes and 
suicides is shown to be related to sport losses, there is no evidence of improvements in 
mood of a similar magnitude after wins. This asymmetry suggests that a more profound 
effect should be observed after ice hockey losses than wins. A similar prediction fol-
lows from the Prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Prospect theory sug-
gests that it is its reliance on gains and losses as carriers of utility, rather than wealth 
levels. That is the reference point, against which gains and losses are measured becomes 
an important determinant of utility.  
 
The reference point in this thesis is supporters’ pre-game expectations of how their team 
will perform. Numerous studies have shown that fans are subject to an allegiance bias, 
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where individuals, who are psychologically invested in a desired outcome, generate 
biased predictions (Markman & Hirt 2002: 58−60). Thus, if the reference point for ice 
hockey fans is that their team will win, a greater stock price reaction after losses than 
after wins is expected.  
 
Another reason why asymmetric reaction to losses and wins is expected is because of 
the eliminations games. It is reasonable to assume that gold medal, bronze medal and 
elimination games in general have a bigger impact on investor mood, because of the 
importance of the games. While winning the game only advances a country to the next 
level, a loss immediately removes the country from the competition. Elimination games 
are forming the second hypothesis. 
 
H2: Wins in elimination games lead to a more profound positive stock market reaction 
and losses in elimination games lead to a more profound negative stock market reaction 
than if all the games in the sample were included. 
 
 
5.3. Methodology Description and Research Process 
 
Time-series data from the stock indices from the four countries mentioned earlier, more 
specifically the price on a broad-base stock market index for each country is used. The 
time-series data for regression are formed by the closing price of the index. Returns are 
defined logarithmically. This approach is backed up by the notion that logarithmic re-
turns follow better standard distribution than absolute returns. Returns are computed by: 
 
(5) 
 
 
where Rit is the logarithmic return of share i on day t. Pit and Pit-1 are closing prices for 
share i on day t and t–1 and log is the natural logarithm. 
 
Under the first and second hypothesis, ice hockey outcomes are correlated with asset 
prices. To estimate the effect of wins and losses on stock returns, a regression model 
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similar to previous studies of the time-series variability of stock returns is used. The 
impact of the outcome of international ice hockey games on stock returns for each coun-
try i is estimated using the following model: 
 
(6) 
 
 
where Rit is the daily logarithmic return of share i on day t, Wit is the dummy variable 
for wins and Lit is the dummy variable for losses. More closely, Wit is a dummy variable 
that equals one, if country i wins an ice hockey game on a day that makes t the first trad-
ing day after the game and zero otherwise. Lit is a dummy that is defined at the same 
way than the win dummy. Finally, uit is the random error term. 
 
To measure the effect of international ice hockey results on stock prices, the return on 
stock market indices from the countries on the first trading day following the game is 
used. Some games that are played during weekdays start already when markets are still 
open. To ensure that the return for a full day when the game outcome is known, the first 
trading day after the game for all games is used. 
 
The dependent variable is the time series of stock indices, more closely the logarithmic 
stock market returns from each country examined.  The independent variable consists of 
the results of the ice hockey games, that is, wins and losses. 
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6. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
The empirical analysis is based on ice hockey wins and losses of four countries, which 
are Czech Republic, Finland, Russia and Sweden. To measure the effect of international 
ice hockey results on stock returns, the returns on stock market indices from these four 
selected countries are being used as well as the world index. 
 
Between the returns of the market indices and the world index the correlation is signifi-
cant at the ,01 level (2-tailed) measured with Pearson correlation as it can be seen from 
the Table 1. Between Finland and Sweden the correlation is highest and between Russia 
and the other countries the correlation is lowest. The correlation between the world in-
dex is highest also for Sweden and Finland and lowest for Russia. Since every index is 
significantly correlated with the world index, no significant differences are assumed. In 
Pearson Correlation test SPSS uses only two levels of significance: * means that p<,05 
and ** means that p<,01. The third level *** (p<,001) is not used. 
 
Table 1. Correlations between stock indices. 
    Czech Republic Finland Russia Sweden World 
Czech  Pearson Correlation 1 ,410** ,326** ,427** ,373** 
Republic Sig. (2-tailed)   ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 
Finland Pearson Correlation ,410** 1 ,268** ,716** ,554** 
  
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000   ,000 ,000 ,000 
Russia Pearson Correlation ,326** ,268** 1 ,266** ,276** 
  
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000   ,000 ,000 
Sweden Pearson Correlation ,427** ,716** ,266** 1 ,631** 
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000 ,000   ,000 
World Pearson Correlation ,373** ,554** ,276** ,631** 1 
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000   
   ** Correlation is significant at the ,01 level (2-tailed).     
 
 
Regression analysis is used to examine the impact of ice hockey game outcomes on 
stock indices. Each country is examined separately. The results from the regression 
analyses can be found from the Table 2 and 3. Table 2 presents the results when all 
games in the sample are included and Table 3 when only elimination games are in-
cluded. 
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As it can be seen from the t-values of Table 2, the only significant results are 0 (con-
stant)
 
for Czech Republic and Russia. For Czech Republic the result is significant at the 
,05 level and for Russia at the ,01 level. The coefficients of the regression analyses in 
Table 2 can be interpreted so that when 1 or 2 are positive the daily stock index return 
is expected to increase by the coefficient and when the coefficients are negative the dai-
ly stock index return is expected to decreases by the coefficient, when compared with 
the days when no games were played, i.e. when dummy variable is zero. 2, which rep-
resents the loss dummy, is more negative than 1, which is the win dummy, in every 
country and also when examined with world index. This implies that losses have a grea-
ter effect on stock returns. 
 
F-test results and the coefficient of determination represent the explanation power of the 
regression analysis. In the Table 2 the coefficient of determination is almost negligible. 
The coefficient of determination in this case implies that ice hockey results do not ex-
plain the changes in stock index returns very well, only ,1 per cent of the changes in the 
stock returns can be explained by ice hockey outcomes. For Russia the coefficient of 
determination is zero. In Table 2, the F-test result is significant only for Czech Republic 
at the ,05 level. It can be seen from the significance mentioned under the F-test results. 
  
Table 2. Results from the Linear Regression: All Games. 
  
0 1 2 R2 F 
Czech Republic ,001 -,002 -,004 ,001 1,452 
t-value/sig. (2,315)* (-1,029) (-1,490)   (,0234a)* 
Finland  ,001 ,000 ,-007 ,001 1,174 
t-value/sig. (1,392) (-,500) (-1,531)   (,309a) 
Russia ,001 ,001 -,002 ,000 ,030 
t-value/sig. (2,634)** (,044) (-,218)   (,971a) 
Sweden ,000 -,001 -,005 ,001 ,767 
t-value/sig. (1,056) (-445) (-1,217)   (,464a) 
World ,000 ,001 -,003 ,001 1,489 
t-value/sig. (1,457) (1,111) (-1,726)   (,226a) 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Wins, Losses    
b. Dependent Variable: Stock Index Return    
  *significant at the ,05 level     
  ** significant at the ,01 level     
  *** significant at the ,001 level     
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As it can be seen from the t-values of Table 3, the only significant results are 0 (con-
stant) and  2 (losses) for Czech Republic and  0 (constant) for Russia. For Czech Re-
public the results are significant at the ,05 level and for Russia at the ,01 level. The coef-
ficients of the regression analyses in Table 3 can be interpreted the same way mentioned 
earlier. 2, which represents the loss dummy, is more negative than 1, which is the win 
dummy, in every country and also when examined with world index. This implies that 
losses have a greater effect on stock returns. From Table 3 can be seen that the win 
dummy is more positive and the loss dummy is more negative in most of the cases 
compared with the dummies in Table 2. That is consistent with the second hypothesis, 
which states that wins in elimination games lead to a more profound positive stock mar-
ket reaction and losses lead to a more profound negative stock market reaction than if 
all the games in the sample were included. 
 
When elimination games are examined the coefficient of determination is also almost 
negligible as it can be seen from Table 3. The coefficient of determination implies that 
elimination games results do not explain the changes in stock index returns very well 
either, only ,1 per cent of the changes in the stock returns can be explained by ice 
hockey outcomes.  In Czech Republic’s case ,3 per cent of the changes can be ex-
plained. In Table 2, the F-test result is significant only for Czech Republic at the ,05 
level. It can be seen from the significance mentioned under the F-test results. 
 
Table 3. Results from the Linear Regression: Elimination games. 
  
0 1 2 R2 F 
Czech Republic ,001 -,002 -,004 ,003 3,678 
 t-value/sig. (2,315)* (-1,056) (-2,414)*   (,025a)* 
Finland  ,001 ,007 -,010 ,001 1,209 
 t-value/sig. (1,196) (,512) (-1,386)  (,229a) 
Russia ,001 ,016 -,005 ,001 1,406 
 t-value/sig. (2,569)** (1,581) (-,004)   (,245a) 
Sweden ,000 ,001 -,008 ,001 ,871 
 t-value/sig. (,998) (,157) (-1,302)  (,419a) 
World ,000 -,001 -,002 ,001 1,199 
 t-value/sig. (1,578) (-,001) (-,002)   (,302a) 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Wins, Losses    
b. Dependent Variable: Stock Index Return    
  *significant at the ,05 level     
  ** significant at the ,01 level     
  *** significant at the ,001 level     
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In the next chapter only t-statistics and p-values are gathered from regression analyses 
to test the hypotheses presented earlier. Also the mean daily logarithmic stock market 
returns and standard deviations between countries are being compared.  
 
 
6.1. Results from All the Included Games  
 
Table 4 provides information about the number of wins and losses in international ice 
hockey games that are included in the sample, as well as the mean daily logarithmic 
stock market returns and standard deviations on the fist trading day after wins and 
losses. The results of the t-tests and p-values of regression analyses can also be seen 
from the table.  
 
Table 4. Wins and losses. 
  Czech Republic Finland Russia Sweden 
Wins 
      
N 39 37 31 45 
Mean 
-,00152 -,00123 ,00166 -,00073 
Std ,0146 ,01821 ,02243 ,014 
Losses 
      
N 18 21 20 16 
Mean 
-,00385 -,00655 ,00012 -,00443 
Std ,01748 ,01543 ,01862 ,01248 
Stock index time-series of  each country   
N 2473 2473 2473 2473 
Mean ,000533 ,000497 ,00144 ,000295 
Std ,00556 ,002387 ,004669 ,003226 
          
t-statistic (wins) -1,029 -,500 ,044 -,445 
p-value (wins) ,303 -,617 ,965 ,656 
t-statistic (losses) -1,49 -1,531 -,218 -1,217 
p-value (losses) ,136 ,126 ,827 ,224 
World index         
t-statistic (wins) ,416 ,406 ,902 ,625 
p-value (wins) ,678 ,685 ,367 ,532 
t-statistic (losses) -,224 1,602 ,433 ,509 
p-value (losses) ,822 ,109 ,665 ,611 
* significant at the ,05 level    
** significant at the ,01 level    
*** significant at the ,001 level    
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As it can be seen from the Table 4, the mean return for stock index time-series from 
each country examined is positive. However, the mean return after both wins and losses 
on a first trading day after the game is negative for all other countries except for Russia. 
It does not seem to matter whether it is a win or a loss. The mean return after losses is 
lowest for Finland. The standard deviation for stock index time-series from each coun-
try examined is highest for Czech Republic and after that for Russia. The standard de-
viation after wins and losses is highest for Russia.  
 
It can be seen from the t-statistics and p-values of Table 4 that significant results cannot 
be found at any significance levels. It can be concluded from the t-statistics and p-
values that for every country, except for Russia, losses seem to have a more significant 
effect than wins, as it was assumed earlier in this thesis. When comparing the results of 
each country with the p-values of world index the biggest difference can be seen in 
losses of Czech Republic. After that the biggest difference was after wins of Czech Re-
public and wins of Russia as well as losses of Sweden. Because no significant market 
decline or increase was observed, H1 is rejected and it is stated that there are no statisti-
cally significant differences in investor behavior after ice hockey wins or losses com-
pared with the days when no ice hockey games were played. 
 
Also Table 5 reports the number of wins and losses in international ice hockey games 
for each country in the sample. The difference between Table 4 is that outliers have 
been detected from the sample. Outliers are identified as observations with large nega-
tive or large positive returns on a day that makes the dummy variables Wit or Lit equal to 
one. 20% of the game-day observations are removed (10% extreme negative observa-
tions and 10% extreme positive observations). 
 
The mean return after removing the outliers is highest for Russia after wins and losses 
and lowest for Czech Republic after wins and for Finland after losses as it was also in 
Table 4. The standard deviation is highest for Russia after wins and losses and lowest 
for Sweden after wins and losses, just like it was in Table 4. As it can be seen from the 
Table 5, the effect remains statistically insignificant after removing outliers. Only little 
improvements in every country’s p-values can be seen after losses. After wins im-
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provements can be seen only in Czech Republic’s and Finland’s p-values. The move-
ments were rather small. For example after losses the p-value of Czech Republic’s im-
proved from ,136 to ,131 and Finland’s p-value from ,126 to ,108. 
 
Table 5. Wins and losses (outliers removed). 
  Czech Republic  Finland  Russia  Sweden  
Wins   
    
  
N 39 37 31 45 
Mean -,00152 -,00123 ,00166 -,00073 
Std ,0146 ,01822 ,02243 ,014 
Losses   
    
  
N 18 21 20 16 
Mean -,00385 -,00655 ,00012 -,00443 
Std  ,01748 ,01543  ,01862 ,01248 
          
t-statistic (wins) -1,043 -,543 ,032 -,435 
p-value (wins) ,297 ,587 ,974 ,664 
t-statistic (losses) -1,509 -1,607 -,255 -1,233 
p-value (losses) ,131 ,108 ,799 ,218 
 * significant at the ,05 level 
 ** significant at the ,01 level 
 *** significant at the ,001 level 
 
 
It can be seen from the t-statistics and p-values of Table 5 that significant results cannot 
be found at any significance levels after removing the outliers either. It can be con-
cluded from the p-values that losses seems to be more significant than wins for every 
country. Based on the results, H1 is rejected also after removing outliers and it is stated 
that there are no statistically significant differences in investor behavior after ice hockey 
wins and losses compared with the days when no ice hockey games were played. 
 
 
6.2. Results from the Elimination Games 
 
Table 6 reports the number of elimination games divided into wins and losses. Table 6 
also reports the mean daily logarithmic stock market returns and standard deviations on 
the fist trading day after wins and losses in elimination games. Statistical findings are 
also reported.  
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Table 6. Wins and losses in elimination games. 
  Czech Republic  Finland  Russia  Sweden  
Wins   
    
  
N 10 11 9 14 
Mean -,00633 ,0038 ,0157 -,00037 
Std ,02063 ,0225 ,01721 ,02024 
Losses   
    
  
N 8 11 9 8 
Mean -,01014 -,00704 ,00141 -,00687 
Std ,02241 ,01805 ,02447 ,01515 
          
t-statistic (wins) -1,056 ,517 1,581 ,157 
p-value (wins) ,318 ,605 ,114 ,874 
t-statistic (losses) -2,414 -1,386 -,004 -1,302 
p-value (losses) ,016* ,196 ,997 ,193 
World index         
t-statistic (wins) ,798 -,517 ,300 2,298 
p-value (wins) ,425 ,605 ,764 ,022 
t-statistic (losses) ,093 ,928 ,360 1,435 
p-value (losses) ,926 ,354 ,719 ,151 
 * significant at the ,05 level       
 ** significant at the ,01 level    
 *** significant at the ,001 level    
 
 
As it can be seen from the Table 6, on the first trading day after ice hockey wins the 
mean return is negative for both Czech Republic and Sweden, and positive for Finland 
and Russia. After losses Russia is the only exception with the positive mean return. 
Russia has the most positive mean return after wins and Czech Republic the lowest 
mean return after losses. This can also be seen from the t-statistics and from p-values. 
After wins, Russia is behaving quite the opposite from the others. Russia’s p-value is 
much lower after wins than losses. When looking at the other countries’ p-values, it is 
the other way around. 
 
Elimination games lead to more profound stock market reaction after wins for Finland 
and Russia and after losses for Czech Republic and Sweden than if all the wins and 
losses were included in the sample. This can be seen when comparing the p-values and 
t-statistics. For those p-values that changed for the worse in Table 6, the change was 
only minor. The changes for better were bigger and extremely big for Russia after wins. 
Only in the case of Czech Republic (t = -2,414; p = ,016)  it can be said that after losses 
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the p-value is significant at the ,05 level, which implies that there are statistically sig-
nificant differences in investor behavior after ice hockey losses in elimination games 
compared with the days when no ice hockey games were played. It can be stated that in 
Czech Republic’s case H1 can be accepted.  
 
When comparing the p-value of Czech Republic and the p-value of the world index with 
other countries’ p-values after losses, the difference is biggest between the world index 
and Czech Republic. This makes sense, because it is assumed that losses in ice hockey 
games of Czech Republic have an impact on stock index of Czech Republic via investor 
mood. A big difference between world index and the country indices can be seen also 
after wins of Russia and Sweden. From the results of Czech Republic, Finland and Swe-
den we can conclude that losses seemed to have a bigger influence than wins on inves-
tor behavior.  
 
H2 that states that, after elimination games more profound effect on stock index returns 
should be observed, can be accepted in half of the cases. H2 can be examined by look-
ing at the p-values in Table 4 and 6. After wins in elimination games p-values became 
better for Finland and Russia and after losses in elimination games for Czech Republic 
and Sweden. In these cases H2 can be accepted and it can be stated that wins in elimina-
tion games lead to a more profound positive stock market reaction and losses in elimi-
nation games lead to a more profound negative stock market reaction than if all the 
games in the sample were included. 
 
Table 7 reports the number of elimination games divided into wins and losses. It also 
reports the mean daily logarithmic stock market returns and standard deviations on the 
first trading day after wins and losses in elimination games. The difference with Table 6 
is that outliers have been removed from the sample. Outliers are removed as mentioned 
earlier. 
 
The mean returns after wins and losses remain almost the same as do the standard de-
viations. Only little change was seen in the outputs of regression analyses and it does 
not show in Table 7, when describing mean returns and standard deviations with 5 
 64 
decimals. Little change, however, can be seen at the t-statistics and p-values. Move-
ments are rather small and they remain statistically as significant as in Table 6 even 
after removing outliers. Only significant result is Czech Republic after losses as it was 
also in Table 6 before removing the outliers. Other movements in p-values were the 
following: After wins the p-value of Czech Republic stayed the same, p-value of 
Finland became a little bit better as it did also for Russia. Sweden’s p-value became a 
little bit worse. After losses all the other p-values became better, except the p-value of 
Finland.  
 
Table 7. Wins and losses in elimination games (outliers removed). 
 Czech Republic Finland Russia Sweden 
Wins   
   
  
N 10 11 9 14 
Mean -,00633 ,0038 ,0157 -,00037 
Std ,02063 ,0225 ,01721 ,02024 
Losses   
   
  
N 8 11 9 8 
Mean -,01014 -,00704 ,00141 -,00687 
Std ,02241 ,01805 ,02447 ,01515 
          
t-statistic (wins) -1,056 ,524 1,738 -,152 
p-value (wins) ,318 ,600 ,082 ,880 
t-statistic (losses) -2,445 -1,239 -,013 -1,324 
p-value (losses) ,015* ,215 ,989 ,186 
 * significant at the ,05 level    
 ** significant at the ,01 level    
 *** significant at the ,001 level    
 
 
Based on the results of Table 7, the p-value after losses of Czech Republic (t = -2,445; p 
= ,015) is significant at the ,05 level. This can be interpreted so that there is a statisti-
cally significant difference in investor behavior after ice hockey losses in elimination 
games of Czech Republic compared with the days when no ice hockey games were 
played. H1 can be accepted in this case. However, the movement was rather small com-
paring with the result of Table 6. No other statistically significant results are obtained 
based on H1 and Table 7.  
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H2 that states that after elimination games more profound effect on stock index returns 
should be observed can be accepted in half of the cases. H2 can be accepted based on 
the p-values in Table 5 and 7. After wins in elimination games p-values became better 
for Finland and after losses in elimination games for Czech Republic, Russia and Swe-
den. In these cases H2 can be accepted and it can be stated that wins in elimination 
games lead to a more profound positive stock market reaction and losses in elimination 
games lead to a more profound negative stock market reaction than if all the games in 
the sample were included. 
 
From the results of Czech Republic, Finland and Sweden we can again conclude that 
losses seemed to have a bigger influence, than wins do, on investor behavior. Russia is 
an exception again with smaller p-value after wins, which was p = ,082.  
 
 
6.3. Overall Results from the Empirical Part 
 
Ultimately it is aspired to solve whether there are significant differences between the 
returns after wins and the returns after losses compared with each other. Earlier wins 
were compared with the days when no games were played and losses as well. After 
comparing the returns after wins and losses, the following results were obtained. The 
results are documented in Table 8. When the difference was examined after all games 
used in the sample, only one significant result is found. The difference between the re-
turns after wins and losses for Finland (t = 2,433; p = ,019) is significant at the ,05 level.  
 
When using only the elimination games two significant results are found. The difference 
between the returns after wins and losses in elimination games are significant for 
Finland (t = 2,602; p = ,020) at the level of ,05 and for Russia (t = 3,425; p = ,005) at 
the level of ,01. Otherwise no significant results are obtained.  
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Table 8. Differences between the returns after wins and losses. 
  Czech Republic Finland  Russia  Sweden 
All games       
t-test 1,572 2,433 1,260 1,098 
p-value ,122 ,019* ,215 ,227 
Elimination games         
t-test 1,515 2,602 3,425 1,454 
p-value ,152 ,020* ,005** ,164 
  *significant at the ,05 level    
  ** significant at the ,01 level    
  *** significant at the ,001 level    
 
 
No negative stock market reaction after losses of international ice hockey games is 
found, except for Czech Republic after elimination games. No evidence of positive 
stock market reaction after wins of international ice hockey games can be found either. 
Removing the outliers did not give any more significant results. In half of the cases it 
can be concluded that elimination games did have more profound effect on stock index 
returns than when using all the games that are included in the sample. In most of the 
cases it can also be concluded that losses did have a bigger influence on stock returns 
than wins. When examining whether there is a difference between the returns after wins 
and losses three significant results were discovered. For Finland after all games and 
after elimination games and also for Russia after elimination games the difference was 
significant. Because of the few significant outcomes it can be roughly said that the re-
sults embed the view that investors are rational and markets are efficient. More rational 
explanation, however, would be that the results of this thesis suggest that it may be pos-
sible that the effect associated with winning or loosing an international ice hockey game 
is too small to influence the national stock market index. Also it cannot be concluded 
based on the thesis that investors are rational and markets are efficient, rather there are 
more important matters that affect investor behavior and thereby stock returns than out-
comes of the international ice hockey games. 
 
There may be many reasons why H1 in every other case, except in Czech Republic’s 
case, and also H2 in that extent that was mentioned earlier, were rejected. It may be that 
the amount of games was too small. One reason might also be that large amount of ice 
hockey games are played during the weekends. Since the first trading day after a week-
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end is Monday, the stock return on Monday was used in many cases. Usually many 
games were played for every country during a weekend, so it was quite common that the 
return on Monday had to be used both after wins and losses for the same country. This 
may eliminate the effect there could have been after only a win or only a loss. This way 
wins and losses could have repealed each other’s effect on stock indices. In previous 
studies, it was shown that losses in soccer games have an impact on stock returns, espe-
cially Football World Cup games. The reason may be, because they are arranged only 
every fourth year as Ice Hockey World Championships are played every year. It be-
comes a more awaited event as it is played more seldom. 
 
There is evidence that sport results have an effect on mood, but at the same time have 
little direct economic impact. It can be concluded that in most of the cases the outcomes 
of the ice hockey games are uncorrelated with the asset prices. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this final chapter both the theoretical and empirical part of the thesis are summed up. 
In addition main contribution of the thesis is explained and suggestions for future re-
search are also made.  
 
The last 30 years have been very exiting for academic finance. Among the many 
changes in views, the increased skepticism about market efficiency stands out. This 
skepticism derives from many sources, including the recognition of the limitations of 
arbitrage, the accumulation of evidence on predictability on stock returns, the observa-
tion of identical securities trading at different prices in different markets, and the salient, 
but unexplained movements in stock market prices, such as the crash of 1987. Of course 
the theories, the evidence and even the unexplained movements have all been subject to 
much debate. However, the cumulative effect has been to put the new discipline, behav-
ioral finance, on the map. 
 
The collaboration between finance and other social sciences has led to a profound deep-
ening of our knowledge about financial markets. It can be concluded that it is essential 
to understand how investors behave before markets can truly be understood. Behavioral 
finance has swayed the leading role of efficient market hypothesis in the academic re-
search done in the field of finance during the past decades. According to behavioral 
finance markets are not correctly priced. Natural persons act in the markets and that is 
why their behavior has a significant role in financial markets, i.e. the market psychology 
is acknowledged.  
 
Markets react to new information, but new information is not the only thing that affects 
stock prices. Recently researchers have shown that also psychological factors have an 
effect on price formation of the stocks. Moreover, when people begin to see financial 
markets as places where different types of investors, some rational and some not, trade 
and understand the forces that shape their demands for securities, many new problems 
may emerge. Ample opportunities for research of how to make markets efficient may 
open up. 
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The objective of the thesis is to show that mood can have an effect on stock returns. The 
purpose is also to expand the existing evidence linking mood to asset prices and also to 
describe the basic literature from market efficiency, behavioral finance and investor 
irrationality. Two hypotheses are set for investigating the link between sport results and 
stock returns.  
 
Motivated by the psychological evidence showing that sport results have a strong effect 
on mood, the thesis investigates whether there is a stock market effect based on interna-
tional ice hockey results. However, no negative stock market reaction after losses of 
international ice hockey games is found, except for Czech Republic after elimination 
games. No evidence of positive stock market reaction after wins of national ice hockey 
games can be found either. Although, it can be seen that in most of the cases losses have 
a larger impact on stock returns than wins do. It can be also stated that in half of the 
cases wins in elimination games lead to a more profound positive stock market reaction 
and losses in elimination games lead to a more profound negative stock market reaction 
than if all the games in the sample were included.  
 
There are many areas and problems that remain poorly answered in behavioral finance 
and in explaining investor irrationality. Future research could be done about the ways to 
calculate and analyze investor sentiment and also how central investor sentiment is for 
security issuance. The predictability of future mispricing could also be examined. It 
could also be examined how investors evaluate risk, for instance, why do they some-
times gamble and sometimes reveal extreme caution. Such matters as investor behavior 
and irrationality after different kinds of events, such as natural disasters, layoffs and 
wage increases could be examined. 
 
Thaler (2000: 135−139) made some predictions about the future concerning, how eco-
nomics will develop over the next couple of decades. He predicts that people will be-
come slower learners and more emotional. Economic models are expected to become 
more heterogeneous. Economists will study human cognition and they will distinguish 
between normative and descriptive theories.  
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It now appears likely that the gap between the views in the two disciplines has been 
permanently narrowed. Yet there are no immediate prospects of economics and psy-
chology sharing a common theory of human behavior. At the moment every prediction 
about the future can be considered as good as the other one. At least it is certain that 
extensive research is going to continue. 
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